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THE MAGIC MIRROR OF “ORIGINAL MEANING”: 
RECENT APPROACHES TO THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
Bret Boyce∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly a century and a half after its adoption, debate continues to rage over the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of basic rights.  Of 
the three clauses in the second sentence of Section One,1 the latter two (the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses) loom very large in modern Supreme Court 
decisions, while the first (the Privileges or Immunities Clause) is of minimal 
importance, having been invoked only once to strike down a state law.2  
Originalists—those who hold that the Constitution should be interpreted according 
to its original meaning—have often deplored this state of affairs.  Many have 
argued that from the perspective of original meaning, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause is not the least important but rather “the most important Clause in the 
Amendment.”3 On this view, many of the constitutional rights today associated 
with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses were originally understood to 
be protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  For example, many 
originalists have criticized the substantive due process doctrine as oxymoronic.4  
Any protection of substantive rights, they insist, must be found in the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, as the Due Process Clause is about procedure only.5  
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law.  B.A. Yale University, Ph. D. 
Brown University, J.D. Northwestern University School of Law.  The Author thanks Saul Cornell, 
Philip Hamburger and Michael J. Perry for helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article. 
 1. “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 2. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-11 (1999) (striking down state law limiting welfare 
benefits for new residents). 
 3. Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1517, 1532 (2008); see also EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 
1863-1869, at 106 (1990) (stating that during the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, “the privileges 
and immunities provision was viewed as being the most significant in terms of the rights protected”); 
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 317 (2007) (“[T]he 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was supposed to be the Amendment’s major source for constitutional 
protection of both civil liberty and civil equality.”). 
 4. See, e.g.,Calabresi, supra note 3, at 1531 (“[T]he very notion of substantive due process is an 
oxymoron.”); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
substantive due process is not a “constitutional right” but an “oxymoron”). 
 5. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 1531-34;see also Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. 
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012)(extensive recent 
originalist attack on the doctrine of substantive due process).  But see Frederick Mark Gedicks, An 
Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the 
Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 594 (2009) (arguing that the due process right enshrined in the 
Fifth Amendment was widely understood to have a substantive component); Ryan C. Williams, The One 
and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 414-17 (2010) (arguing that the original 
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Originalists have also argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Due 
Process Clause, is the most plausible vehicle for the application of the guarantees 
of the Bill of Rights against the states.6  Likewise, many originalists have 
maintained that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Equal Protection 
Clause, is the most important general mandate of legislative equal treatment,7 as the 
Equal Protection Clause requires only equality in the provision of the protective 
functions of government (which are principally executive and judicial), not in all 
legislative classifications.8  
The Supreme Court’s current narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause dates back to its very first decision interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Slaughter-House Cases,9 handed down only five years after the Amendment 
was ratified.  In that decision the Court rejected the notion that the Clause protects 
a broad array of fundamental rights or that it generally prohibits discriminatory 
legislation; the decision has also been read to preclude incorporation through that 
Clause.10 Thus, in the view of many originalists, the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses have had to bear more weight than originally envisioned—due 
process was transformed from a procedural into a substantive guarantee, while the 
“equal protection of the laws” was transmogrified into the “protection of equal 
laws.”11    
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,12 the Supreme Court declined an invitation to 
                                                                                                     
understanding of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (but not that of the Fifth 
Amendment) was broad enough to encompass a recognizable form of substantive due process).  
 6. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163-214 
(1998).  
 7. See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 
1385, 1389-91 (1992) 
 8. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-
Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 3 (2008); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense 
of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. 
L.J. 219, 219-20 (2009).  Cf. Harrison, supra note 7, at 1390 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires equality in “the administration of laws” or in “laws that protect,” not equality in all legislation). 
 9. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 10. The question at issue in Slaughter-House, whether the state had the power to create a 
corporation with a monopoly on the slaughtering of livestock in New Orleans, did not implicate the 
applicability of rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights to the states.  But the Court maintained that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was not “intended as a protection to the citizen of a State against the 
legislative power of his own State.”  Id. at 74.  Rather, the Court insisted, it protected only such rights as 
“owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”  Id. 
at 79.  The Court’s partial enumeration of these rights in dicta consisted largely or entirely of rights vis-
à-vis the federal government, but the Court did include “[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition 
for redress of grievances, [and] the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus” on the list. Id. Some scholars 
have concluded therefore that Slaughter-House did not rule out incorporation through the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.  See, e.g., Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A 
Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 648-49, 666-87(2000).  But it is 
hardly clear that the Court meant that the right to petition state governments or obtain habeas relief 
against them was protected by the Clause.  In any case, subsequent decisions, relying in part on 
Slaughter-House, seem clearly to preclude incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
(although Newsom argues for a contrary reading).  See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 
549-53 (1876). 
 11. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 12. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
32 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
overrule Slaughter-House and restore what the plaintiffs contended was the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.13  In McDonald, the first 
incorporation case to come before the Court in several decades, there was little 
doubt that the Court was poised to hold the right in question (handgun possession 
in the home) applicable against the states.14  However, the Court declined to 
reground the incorporation doctrine in the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather 
than the Due Process Clause.   
Four Justices in the majority, led by Justice Alito, continued to adhere to the 
due process approach,15 as did the four dissenting Justices.16  The Alito plurality 
rejected the plaintiffs’ originalist arguments centered on the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause with the laconic observation that the plaintiffs were “unable to 
identify the Clause’s full scope” and that there was no “consensus on that question 
among the scholars who agree that the Slaughter-House Cases’ interpretation is 
flawed.”17  Likewise, Justice Stevens agreed that the original meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was too uncertain to provide a proper basis for 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Brief for Petitioner at 65, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4378912.  
While arguments based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause occupied 57 pages of the Argument 
section of the brief, arguments based on the Due Process Clause took up a mere seven pages.  See id. at 
72.  
 14. Two years earlier, the Court had held the right applicable against the Federal Government in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). It was clear already in Heller that the Court would 
proceed to incorporate this right against the states, because the Court there held (however implausibly) 
that individual self-defense was “the central component” of the Second Amendment right, and that that 
right applied especially to handguns because of their popularity.  Id. at 599; see also id. at 628-29.  In 
fact, much historical scholarship has rejected the notion that self-defense was central to the original 
understanding of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law 
Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1109, 1101-18 
(2009); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning 
and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295, 
1303-07 (2009).  Rather, the Second Amendment right was understood as a civic right closely bound up 
with service in a well-regulated militia, not a purely individual right centered on personal self-defense, 
as Justice Scalia claimed in Heller.  See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 9-70 (2006).  Even some originalists and 
gun-rights supporters have harshly criticized Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller.  See, e.g., Nelson Lund, 
The Second Amendment, Heller and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009) 
(criticizing the opinion as “transparently nonoriginalist” and “an embarrassment”); J. Harvie Wilkinson 
III, Of Guns, Abortions and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 274 (2009) (criticizing the 
opinion as “a form of judicial activism” that “cannot be justified by originalism because originalism did 
not dictate the outcome”).  But many other originalists praised Heller as a vindication of their approach. 
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 
2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion [in Heller] is the finest example of what is now called ‘original 
public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”); Lawrence B. Solum, District of 
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 980 (2009) (“Heller is certainly the 
clearest and most prominent example of originalism in contemporary Supreme Court 
jurisprudence . . . .”).  And the McDonald majority continued to adhere to the historical analysis in 
Heller, which “point[ed] unmistakably” to the subsequent incorporation of the right.  McDonald, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3036. 
 15. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030-36, 3044-48, 3050 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 16. See id. at 3088-120 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (focusing on substantive due process); id. at 3120-
36 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (focusing on due process incorporation). 
 17. Id. at 3030 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
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modern incorporation doctrine.18  Only Justice Thomas embraced the plaintiffs’ 
originalist argument.19  Thomas characterized the Court’s continued reliance on the 
Due Process Clause for the protection of substantive rights as a “particularly 
dangerous” “legal fiction.”20  Restoration of the “original meaning” of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, Justice Thomas argued, would allow the Court “to 
enforce the rights the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to protect with greater 
clarity and predictability than the substantive due process framework has so far 
managed.”21 
This Article argues that the intractable ambiguities surrounding the historical 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment made the Court’s retreat from originalism 
in McDonald all but inevitable.  As a majority of Justices there recognized, the 
original understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is far from clear, 
despite the enormous scholarly attention devoted to uncovering its historical 
meaning.  Even Justice Thomas, the Court’s most doctrinaire originalist, has 
admitted that there is no scholarly consensus on this question.22  Thomas’ own 
analysis of that Clause, shifting among several inconsistent definitions of privileges 
and immunities without adequately exploring the differences among them,23 hardly 
supports his claim that its meaning is clear and predictable.  While conceding that 
the legislative history of the Clause is “less than crystal clear,” Thomas drew 
selectively on a handful of statements in the historical record to conclude that the 
case for incorporation is unambiguous.24  As this Article will show, the same 
                                                                                                     
 18. See id. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the original meaning of the Clause is not 
as clear as [plaintiffs] suggest” and reinvigoration of the clause would only invite judicial 
policymaking).  Justice Breyer’s dissent simply ignored the Privileges or Immunities Clause and focused 
entirely on the question of whether the right to private self-defense was “fundamental” for purposes of 
the standard Due Process Clause selective incorporation approach.  See, e.g., id. at 3120 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). At oral argument, even the avowed originalist Justice Scalia proved remarkably unreceptive 
to the plaintiffs’ originalist arguments.  To repeated outbursts of laughter, Justice Scalia dismissed the 
privileges or immunities argument as the “darling of the professoriate” and sarcastically suggested that 
perhaps the plaintiffs’ counsel was “bucking for . . . a place on some law school faculty.” Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 7, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521).  Observing that this argument was 
“contrary to 140 years of our jurisprudence,” Scalia suggested that it would be better to rely on 
“substantive due process, which as much as I think it’s wrong, I have—even I have acquiesced in it.”  
Id. 
 19. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).  
 20. Id. at 3062. The Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, according to Justice Thomas, 
lacks any “guiding principle to distinguish ‘fundamental’ rights that warrant protection from 
nonfundamental rights that do not.” Id. In particular, Justice Thomas suggested, there can be no serious 
claim that the Due Process Clause was originally understood to protect currently recognized rights of 
reproductive and sexual autonomy. See id. (citing with disapproval Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Legal scholars agree 
on little beyond the conclusion that the Clause does not mean what the Court said it meant in 1873.”)  
 23. In the space of less than two pages, Thomas suggests that “privileges and immunities” were (1) 
nonspecific synonyms “used interchangeably” for rights in general; (2) synonymous terms denoting 
special rights enjoyed only by a particular subclass of persons; (3) nonsynonymous terms, where 
“immunities” referred to the residuum of natural rights retained in civil society while privileges referred 
to positive rights provided by society in lieu of relinquished natural rights. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 
3063-64 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
 24. Id. at 3075. 
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selectivity is evident in the work of many originalist scholars, leading to wildly 
differing interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It is not surprising, given its ambiguous text and history, that there is no 
consensus among scholars and historians regarding the original meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause and hence of the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
whole.  Recent interpretations literally run the gamut from the claim that the Clause 
protected no new rights, to the claim that it protected an open-ended set of rights 
that can never be completely specified or enumerated.  This Article focuses on the 
most prominent recent originalist interpretations,25 which may be divided into two 
broad methodological groups.   
In the first group, Philip Hamburger and Kurt Lash have undertaken a detailed 
review of the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment and have enhanced our 
understanding of its historical meaning in important ways.  Yet they reach 
irreconcilable conclusions about the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.  Hamburger argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment simply recapitulated the rights already protected by the 
Comity Clause (the Privileges and Immunities Clause) of Article IV26—it merely 
reiterated the preexisting constitutional prohibition of discrimination against out-of-
state residents in a limited class of state-conferred rights.27  In contrast, Lash argues 
that during the antebellum period, the term “privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States” was used to refer not to state-conferred rights, but to rights 
“expressly conferred by the Federal Constitution.”28  He maintains that John 
Bingham, the draftsman of Section One, purposely abandoned his original language 
directly tracking the Comity Clause (“privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several States”) in favor of the language eventually included in the Fourteenth 
Amendment (“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”) in order to 
make clear that the latter referred to a completely different set of rights, namely the 
rights “textually enumerated” in the first eight amendments.29  Finally, Lash argues 
that the public debates following Congress’ adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, particularly during the election campaign of 1866, show that the 
original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause “referred to the 
personal rights enumerated in the federal Constitution.”30  Lash’s views on the 
                                                                                                     
 25. For a discussion of earlier scholarly interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
which similarly run the gamut from extremely narrow to quite expansive, see Bret Boyce, Originalism 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 987-1026 (1998). 
 26. Some scholars refer to both clauses as the “Privileges and Immunities Clause.”  To avoid 
confusion, this article will distinguish in nomenclature between the Comity Clause (or Privileges and 
Immunities Clause) of Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 27. See Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 61-62 (2011). 
 28. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and 
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1245 (2010) [hereinafter Lash, Origins 
Part I]. 
 29. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and 
the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 334 (2011) [hereinafter Lash, Origins 
Part II]. 
 30. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part III: Andrew Johnson and 
the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 GEO. L.J. 1275, 1282 (2013) [hereinafter Lash, Origins Part 
III]. 
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original meaning of that Clause have evolved considerably over time.  Although he 
once wrote that it “seems tailor-made for the recognition of nontextual fundamental 
freedoms,”31 he has since repudiated that position.  His current view is that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects “the substantive personal rights listed in 
the first eight Amendments, as well as the equal rights of sojourning citizens 
protected under the Comity Clause of Article IV.”32  
The second methodological group is much less concerned with detailed 
historical inquiry.  These scholars typically stress that what matters is the “original 
public meaning” of a constitutional provision rather than the framers’ specific 
expectations as to how it would be applied.  Indeed, those specific expectations 
may be ignored where they contradict the “original public meaning.”  Critically, 
scholars in this group tend to formulate the “original public meaning” at a very 
high and abstract level of generality, broad enough to justify results that the framers 
and ratifiers would not have contemplated and in many cases specifically 
disavowed.  They typically rely on a handful of statements in the historical record 
as conclusive of the original public meaning, and hence they shed little new light 
on the Amendment’s historical meaning.  But their methodology enables them to 
reach virtually any result that is consistent with current doctrine, as well as results 
that are more or less expansive.  Such abstract approaches are not significantly less 
constraining than most nonoriginalist approaches; indeed, this “new originalism” is 
typically less constraining and more indeterminate than common law 
constitutionalism.   
In this second group, Steven Calabresi has deployed such arguments to defend 
well-entrenched aspects of modern judicial doctrine while rejecting any major new 
extensions.  For example, he proposes an originalist defense of the modern doctrine 
that the Fourteenth Amendment bans sex discrimination, despite the framers’ 
explicit disavowal that it would have that effect.33  In general, Calabresi endorses 
those decisions whose repudiation would be a serious embarrassment for moderate 
conservatives (those banning school segregation and sex discrimination, or 
recognizing rights of contraception and racial intermarriage), while ruling out 
judicial protection of rights still widely rejected by conservative opinion (such as 
abortion or same-sex marriage).34  According to Calabresi, “the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not a license to the Supreme Court to engage in transformative 
change.”35  In contrast, Jack Balkin deploys a new originalist approach (which he 
calls “framework originalism”36) to defend politically liberal results, arguing 
provocatively that “the debate between originalism and living constitutionalism 
                                                                                                     
 31. Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed Amar’s The Bill of 
Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 500 (1999). 
 32. Lash, Origins Part III, supra note 30, at 1282; see also Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 460 & n.49 (2009) [hereinafter Beyond Incorporation] (describing 
Lash’s evolution on this question). 
 33. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
4-11 (2011). 
 34. See Steven G. Calabresi, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice For All?, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 150-55 (2011). 
 35. Id. at 149. 
 36. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011). 
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rests on a false dichotomy.”37 Balkin’s originalism not only defends most of the 
modern Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence (including, perhaps most 
controversially, its abortion decisions38), but is open to further transformative 
doctrinal developments.  Randy Barnett’s approach is even more revolutionary.  He 
argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects both “natural or inherent 
liberty rights” and positive law rights,39 and that the natural rights thus protected 
are “literally boundless” and “unenumerable.”40  Although a case can be made for 
each of those positions, this Article argues that a significant case can also be made 
against each of them.  The historical evidence simply does not permit any confident 
assertion regarding the exact scope of the rights protected, or the abridgments 
prohibited, by the Privileges or Immunities Clause or by the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a whole. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that in the law, “as in a magic mirror, we see 
reflected, not only our own lives, but the lives of all men that have been!”41  Given 
the vagueness and ambiguity of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, the multifarious 
history of its framing and ratification, and the flexibility of current “public meaning 
originalism,” it is not surprising that public meaning originalists have reached such 
dramatically divergent conclusions about its proper interpretation and construction.  
When they peer into the magic mirror of its meaning, originalists tend to see 
reflected their own political philosophies and ideological presumptions. 
This Article concludes that the absence of a clear original meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause (or of Section One as a whole) is a strong reason 
for rejecting originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation.  The second 
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is the central text on which the system of 
protection of individual rights in our constitutional order rests, and the failure of 
originalist scholars to construct a convincing and generally accepted account of its 
meaning is a powerful indictment of originalism.   
For nearly a century and a half, the Fourteenth Amendment has been infused 
with meaning through an evolutionary process of common-law adjudication.  The 
legitimacy of the doctrines thus established (such as incorporation, the prohibition 
of sex discrimination, the ban on racial segregation in public schools, the one-
person-one-vote rule, or the unconstitutionality of miscegenation laws) does not 
rest on their compatibility with the original public meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  However tenuously grounded in original meaning, such doctrines are 
secure as a matter of actual constitutional practice.  That practice is characterized 
by an incrementalist and instrumentalist common-law approach42 that, despite its 
flaws, has broadly provided both sufficient stability to guarantee the rule of law and 
                                                                                                     
 37. Balkin, supra note 3, at 292. 
 38. See id. at 319-40. 
 39. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 63 
(2004). 
 40. Id. at 55-57. 
 41. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Law, in SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 17 (1891).  
Holmes’s dictum and his views about the importance of history for the understanding of law inspired the 
title for KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2d ed. 
2009). 
 42. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3, 33-49 (2010) (describing the 
common law approach of constitutional interpretation and contrasting it with originalism). 
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the flexibility to permit evolutionary change and increasing protection of equality 
and human dignity within our constitutional order. 
II.  RECENT ORIGINALIST INTERPRETATIONS 
Over the past two decades, as various theorists have sought to refine and 
redefine originalism in response to internal and external criticism, the “new 
originalism” that has emerged has increasingly focused on theories of language and 
interpretation.43  There exists today a wide variety of originalist approaches, so 
much so that some have argued originalism is losing its coherence and its 
usefulness as a descriptive term.44  Thomas Colby has helpfully catalogued the 
most important theoretical moves of the new originalism as follows, with the 
caveat that while “[v]irtually every originalist has embraced at least some of these 
moves, . . . only a few have explicitly embraced all of them”: 
(a) the move from original intent to original meaning; (b) the move from 
subjective meaning to objective meaning; (c) the move from actual to hypothetical 
understanding; (d) the embrace of standards and general principles; (e) the 
embrace of broad levels of generality; (f) the move from original expected 
application to original objective principles; (g) the distinction between 
interpretation and construction; and (h) the distinction between normative and 
semantic originalism.45 
Indeed many of these moves are hardly “new.”  For example, Justice Antonin 
Scalia and Robert Bork rejected “original intent” in favor of “original public 
meaning” as long ago as the 1980s, and most originalists have followed them.46  
But as Colby has pointed out, although collectively these moves have addressed 
many of the practical and theoretical defects of earlier forms of originalism, they 
have rendered modern originalism so indeterminate as to sacrifice “any pretense of 
a power to constrain judges to a meaningful degree.”47 
Of the originalist scholars whose work is examined here, Hamburger and Lash 
pay closest attention to the historical record.  Hamburger seems to eschew even the 
term “originalism” itself, as well as its recent theoretical apparatus, although he is 
clearly engaged in a search for the “historical meaning”48 of the Constitution, 
                                                                                                     
 43. Some influential representative examples of new originalist approaches include: KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 
(1999); and Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
427 (2007). 
 44. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244-46, 
256-67 (2009). 
 45. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 719-20 (2011). 
 46. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic 
Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ORIGINAL MEANING 
JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (1987) (suggesting a “campaign to change the label from the 
Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (arguing that originalists seek not the 
“subjective intention” of the framers but “what the public of that time would have understood the words 
to mean”). 
 47. Colby, supra note 45, at 714. 
 48. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 63. 
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which he treats as normatively binding.  Lash embraces “‘original public meaning 
originalism’ as a normatively attractive approach to constitutional interpretation,” 
stressing that “the personal intentions of the framers . . . hav[e] weight only to the 
degree that they reflect or illuminate the likely public understanding of the text.”49   
The remaining scholars discussed here embrace most or all of the 
hermeneutical moves of the new originalism.50  Calabresi, Balkin, and Barnett all 
take as their starting point the position that only the original semantic meaning of 
the text (which they all construe at a high level of abstraction), not the framers’ 
expectations regarding the application of the text, is binding.  Yet given the 
indeterminacy of the bare text of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite their rejection 
of expectations-based originalism, all rely heavily in practice not just on arguments 
about the semantic meaning of its language in its historical context, but on specific 
statements by the framers as perhaps the most important evidence of its likely 
public meaning.  Yet rather than comprehensively canvassing the historical record, 
they tend to seize on a handful of specific statements to establish a highly abstract 
“original meaning,” upon which they proceed to erect a fairly elaborate 
superstructure of constitutional construction that is not closely tethered to the 
framers’ and ratifiers’ historical understandings. 
A.  HISTORICAL ORIGINALISM 
1. Hamburger: Interjurisdictional Discrimination  
Philip Hamburger argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected exactly the same rights as the Comity Clause 
(Privileges and Immunities Clause) of Article IV.51  That is, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was not a guarantee of a fixed set of substantive rights (whether 
natural rights of property and contract, or, as incorporationists have argued, the 
specific rights protected in the federal Bill of Rights), nor was it a prohibition of 
discrimination by a state against its own citizens.  Rather, “the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause protected Comity Clause rights”52—it served simply to prohibit 
states from discriminating against citizens (especially black citizens) from other 
states. 
As Hamburger concedes, if this is really the “historical meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause,” it may “seem strangely 
redundant and poorly expressed.”53  Hamburger’s interpretation does indeed make 
the Clause seem redundant, because it is unclear how it adds anything new to the 
Constitution. It is certainly true, as Hamburger amply documents, that during the 
antebellum period blacks seeking to travel interstate were denied Comity Clause 
rights (and often barred from entering other states altogether) on the ground that 
                                                                                                     
 49. Lash, Origins Part II, supra note 29, at 338-39. 
 50. See BARNETT, supra note 39, at 89-130; JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3-125 (2011); 
Balkin, supra note 43; Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 549 (2009). 
 51. See Hamburger, supra note 27, at 122.  
 52. Id. at 145. 
 53. Id. at 68. 
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they were not citizens,54 and there was doubt about whether Congress had the 
power to enforce the Comity Clause.55  But the Citizenship Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment56 made clear that blacks were indeed national and state 
citizens, while the Enforcement Clause57 gave Congress the power to protect their 
rights.  It is thus hard to see what the Privileges or Immunities Clause added, if it 
merely recapitulated the Comity Clause.  And while the language of Article IV’s 
Comity Clause58 clearly protects out-of-state citizens when visiting another state, 
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause59 
seems to protect all citizens of the United States in every state (whether citizens of 
the state in question or out-of-staters). 
However, Hamburger argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause must be 
understood within a “genealogy of ideas . . . from at least 1821 to 1866, that 
concerned the mobility of free blacks and that often was framed in terms of the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”60  This genealogy of 
ideas, he argues, is not merely “a context but the context”61 that furnishes the key 
to the Clause’s meaning.   
Hamburger’s starting point is the debates in Congress following the admission 
of Missouri as a slave state under the Compromise of 1820.  The new constitution 
of Missouri, which not only protected slavery but also required the exclusion of 
free blacks from the state, threatened to unravel that compromise, triggering a 
round of debates in 1821 focusing on the citizenship and Comity Clause rights of 
free blacks.62  The new crisis was defused by the passage of a congressional 
resolution, drafted by Henry Clay, reciting that the Missouri Constitution “shall 
never be construed to authorize the passage of any law . . . by which any citizen, of 
either of the States in this Union, shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of 
the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the 
Constitution of the United States.”63  Although this episode did little to resolve 
controversies over the meaning and scope of the Comity Clause or the rights of free 
blacks, its significance for Hamburger is that it raised the prospect that Comity 
Clause rights could be treated as national rights enforceable by the federal 
government.64 
As Hamburger discusses, after the Missouri episode focused debate on the 
                                                                                                     
 54. See id. at 83-100. 
 55. See id. at 121-22. 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”). 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
 60. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 66.  
 61. Id. at 133. 
 62. See id. at 84-86. 
 63. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 1830 (1821). 
 64. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 88 (the 1821 episode “forcefully refocused the debate about 
privileges and immunities on the question of federal citizenship”). 
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interrelationship between rights and citizenship, and on the citizenship rights of 
blacks in particular, a number of U.S. attorneys general65 and state courts66 
concluded that because free blacks were denied certain rights (especially political 
rights), they could not be regarded as citizens for statutory or constitutional 
purposes.  In this context, Hamburger argues, the most famous antebellum Comity 
Clause decision, Corfield v. Coryell,67 must be reevaluated.  Although that case 
ostensibly had nothing to do with the rights of free blacks, Hamburger discerns a 
“racist” agenda behind Justice Washington’s opinion, which he considers “a 
precursor of Dred Scott.”68  As a slaveholder anxious to exclude free blacks from 
citizenship, Hamburger argues, Justice Washington included suffrage among the 
privileges and immunities of citizens because “[p]olitical rights were the standard 
example of what blacks did not have.”69  
Thus, Hamburger argues, those who opposed slavery and championed the 
rights of free blacks spoke increasingly of Comity Clause rights as privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States.  For example, in an 1854 debate, 
Senator Sumner referred to the imprisonment and enslavement of black 
Massachusetts citizens in the South as a violation of “the privileges and immunities 
                                                                                                     
 65. See id. at 89-93.  The first of these opinions, by Attorney General William Wirt, argued that 
because free blacks in Virginia could not vote, hold office, testify against whites, serve in the militia, or 
marry white persons, they were not state citizens and hence not federal citizens.  Rights of Free Virginia 
Negroes, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 506, 506-09 (1821).  Wirt’s analysis specifically referred to the Comity 
Clause.  Id. at 507.  Although Wirt’s opinion left open the possibility that some free blacks (those in 
states that granted them equal rights with whites) might be U.S. citizens, a later U.S. Attorney General, 
Roger B. Taney in 1832, went even further and insisted in an unpublished opinion (25 years before his 
decision in Dred Scott) that no blacks could be U.S. citizens.  See CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. 
TANEY 154 (1935).  Attorneys General John MacPherson Berrien and Caleb Cushing also issued 
opinions rejecting black citizenship.  See Validity of the South Carolina Police Bill, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 
426 (1831) (Berrien); Relation of Indians to Citizenship, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746 (1856) (Cushing); Right 
of Expiration, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 139 (1858) (Cushing).  Hugh Legaré, who concluded that blacks were 
eligible to purchase federal lands reserved to citizens, but expressly declined to decide whether they 
were to be considered citizens for political purposes, was only a partial exception to this trend.  See Pre-
emption Rights of Colored Persons, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 147 (1843).  See generally MARK A. GRABER, 
DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 29 & n.84 (2006) (citing all these opinions); 
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
361 (1978) ( “[T]he general tendency of federal executive rulings had indeed been unfavorable to Negro 
citizenship.”).  The view that blacks were not citizens was repudiated only in 1862, by Lincoln’s first 
attorney general, Edward Bates.  See Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382 (1862). 
 66. Hamburger focuses on Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 334 (1822), which held that free 
blacks could not be citizens, and Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 345-47 (1834), in which the Chief 
Justice of Connecticut reached the same conclusion. See Hamburger, supra note 27, at 91-93.  He could 
have cited many more.  In fact, “virtually every state court that ruled on black citizenship before 1857 
[when Dred Scott was decided] concluded that free persons of color were neither state nor American 
citizens.”  GRABER, supra note 65, at 29.  Graber cites case law from 18 jurisdictions, including free 
states such as (in addition to Connecticut) Pennsylvania, California, and Indiana.  See id. n.83.  Indeed, 
“[t]he Supreme [Judicial] Court of Massachusetts was the only bench that, before Dred Scott, clearly 
indicated that free blacks were state citizens.” Id. (citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 
198, 206 (1849)). 
 67. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
 68. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 146. 
 69. Id. at 96. See also id. at 97-100 (discussing Dred Scott); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
393, 405-11 (1857) (Chief Justice Taney’s discussion of black citizenship).  
2013] THE MAGIC MIRROR 41 
of citizens of the United States.”70  In 1858, free blacks in Boston petitioned the 
state legislature to protect black citizens of Massachusetts seeking to visit the South 
from violations of “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”71  In 
the 1859 debate over the admission of Oregon to the Union with a constitution that 
would have barred entry to free blacks, Representative John Bingham insisted that 
the proposed state constitution would violate the Comity Clause’s guarantee of the 
“privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States.”72  
Finally, Hamburger observes that during the same period that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was being drafted, Congress “briefly considered” a bill proposed by 
Representative Samuel Shellabarger “[t]o declare and protect all the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States.”73  Although 
Shellabarger’s Privileges and Immunities Bill received only very limited attention 
in Congress and was never enacted because of constitutional objections,74 
Hamburger views it as the “missing link” that connects the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause to the antebellum Comity Clause 
debates stretching back to the Missouri Compromise.”75  
While Hamburger’s “genealogy of ideas” thus provides a context explaining 
how the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause could have been 
understood to refer simply to Comity Clause rights, it is far from clear that it 
provides, as he claims, the context.  Hamburger concedes that “some statements in 
the debates could be understood as alluding to incorporation.”76  The most 
important of these was the speech of Senator Jacob M. Howard introducing the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the floor of the Senate,77 which forms the lynchpin of 
the originalist argument for incorporation.  Howard began his discussion of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause by referring to the rights protected by the Comity 
Clause.  He observed that the Supreme Court had never resolved the “curious 
question” 78 of the scope of the Comity Clause, but quoted at length from the “very 
learned and excellent” Justice Bushrod Washington’s circuit court decision in 
Corfield v. Coryell as an authoritative exposition.79  Howard then continued: “To 
                                                                                                     
 70. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 108 (quoting the debate as reported in a black newspaper, 8 
NAT’L ERA (D.C.) 119 (1854)). 
 71. Id. at 110 (quoting William C. Nell & Other Colored Citizens of Massachusetts, Rights of 
Colored Citizens, 29 LIBERATOR (Bos.) 11 (1859)). 
 72. Id. at 112 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981, 984 (1859) (statement of Rep. John 
Bingham)). 
 73. Id. at 115  n.187 (quoting H.R. 437, 39th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 
2, 1866)). 
 74. See id. at 117-22. 
 75. Id. at 116. 
 76. Id. at 131. 
 77. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866). 
 78. Id. at 2765. 
 79. Id.  According to the passage in Justice Washington’s opinion quoted by Senator Howard, the 
privileges and immunities protected by the Comity Clause are confined 
to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, 
of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been 
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of 
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, 
it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all 
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these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and 
cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should be 
added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of 
the Constitution,”80 which he then proceeded to summarize.  After observing that 
under existing law Congress had no power to enforce those provisions and that “the 
States are not restrained from violating the principles embraced in them except by 
their own local constitutions, which may be altered from year to year,” Howard 
concluded: “The great object of the first section of this amendment is . . . to restrain 
the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great 
fundamental guarantees.”81  Howard thus seemed clearly to state that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights. 
Hamburger labors mightily to reconcile these statements with his view that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only Comity Clause rights.  When 
Howard stated that the Fourteenth Amendment would compel the states to respect 
“the principles embraced in” the federal Bill of Rights, Hamburger argues he must 
have meant that the states would have to respect “these principles, as guaranteed in 
state bills of rights,” because the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional equality of treatment (under the Privileges 
or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses respectively).82  While clever, this 
reading seems forced and improbable.  After all, Howard complained that the 
problem with relying on state constitutions was that they “may be altered from year 
to year,” and he asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment would remedy this by 
requiring the states “at all times” to respect those guarantees.  The clear implication 
is that the Fourteenth Amendment would protect the rights guaranteed in the 
federal Bill of Rights from state infringement regardless of the vicissitudes of state 
law.  Moreover, Howard suggested that the Amendment would supersede Barron v. 
Baltimore,83 which had held that the federal Takings Clause did not bind the 
states.84  But under Hamburger’s reading, the Fourteenth Amendment would not 
                                                                                                     
comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, 
and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as 
the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a 
citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, 
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas 
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, 
hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes 
or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some 
of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the 
general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added, the 
elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in 
which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, 
strictly speaking, privileges and immunities . . . . 
Id. (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 2766. 
 82. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 131 (emphasis added). 
 83. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 84. Id. at 2765 (“[I]t has been repeatedly held that the restriction contained in the Constitution 
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation is not a restriction upon 
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supersede Barron (many state constitutions at the time had no takings clause).85 
Hamburger argues that the historical and sociological context points to cross-
jurisdictional equality rather than incorporation as the goal of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause: “Blacks had little need for assurances of any particular 
substantive federal rights, let alone incorporation.  But they had a great need for 
federal guarantees of voting, due process, and especially equality—both local 
equality and cross-jurisdictional equality.”86  This is only half right.  The 
overwhelming focus of the debates over both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment was unequal treatment, as embodied especially in the new 
Black Codes.87  There was little discussion of the need for incorporation of 
                                                                                                     
State legislation, but applies only to the legislation of Congress.”).  Barron was the leading such 
decision, although Howard did not refer to it by name. 
 85. The Maryland Constitution contained no takings clause, and while the trial court had granted 
relief, citing the state constitution’s due process provision and general principles of natural law, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.  See Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 
92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (2007).  Thus, under Hamburger’s reading, the Fourteenth Amendment would 
have afforded the plaintiff in Barron no relief. 
 86. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 71. 
 87. The primary purpose of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment was 
to prohibit the widespread restrictions on civil rights embodied in the Black Codes passed in the former 
Confederate states.  For example, the drafter of the Civil Rights Bill, Senator Lyman Trumbull of 
Illinois, stated that its purpose was “to destroy all these discriminations” and to protect “[s]uch 
fundamental rights as belong to every free person.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).  
Trumbull noted that the Comity Clause protected such rights against interstate discrimination but 
insisted that it was necessary to go further and protect them against intrastate discrimination: “[H]ow 
much more are the native born citizens of the State itself entitled to these rights!”  Id. at 475. Likewise, 
Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, the most influential member of the House of Representatives, 
seemed to view the Fourteenth Amendment as a simple antidiscrimination provision. According to 
Stevens, the Amendment merely ensured that legislation must be “equal, impartial to all.” Id. at 1063.  
When Stevens introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the House, he indicated that while some might 
say “[y]our civil rights bill secures the same things,” the Amendment, by enshrining the protections of 
the Civil Rights Act into the Constitution, secured them against repeal by a subsequent majority in 
Congress.  Id. at 2459.  Most speakers who discussed Section One in the ensuing debate in the House 
similarly argued, as Stevens had, that it simply constitutionalized the principles of the Civil Rights Act, 
or that it established beyond doubt Congress’ power to enact that Act.  For example, Rep. James A. 
Garfield (R. Ohio) (future President of the United States) stated that the purpose of Section One was to 
protect the principles of the Civil Rights Act from repeal: “[W]e propose to lift that great and good law 
above the reach of political strife, beyond the reach of the plots and machinations of any party, and fix it 
in the serene sky, in the eternal firmament of the Constitution . . . .”  Id. at 2462.  Rep. Martin R. Thayer 
(R. Pa.) stated that the Amendment “is but incorporating in the Constitution of the United States the 
principle of the civil rights bill.”  Id. at 2465.  Rep. John H. Broomall (R. Pa.) indicated that the House 
had already voted for the principles underlying the Amendment “in another shape, in the civil rights 
bill,” and thus the House was merely asked to “put a provision in the Constitution which is already 
contained in an act of Congress.”  Id. at 2498.  Rep. Henry J. Raymond (R. N.Y.) indicated that the 
principle underlying Section One, “which secures an equality of rights among all the citizens of the 
United States” was “first embodied in” the Bingham Amendment, and then “came before us in the form 
of a bill, by which Congress proposed to exercise precisely the powers the amendment was intended to 
confer.”  Id. at 2502.  Raymond’s statement is interesting, because just like Bingham, he was one of the 
few Republicans to vote against the Civil Rights Act out of constitutional scruples, but he supported the 
principles behind it and voted in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Rep. Thomas D. Eliot (R. Mass.), 
who voted for the Civil Rights Act on the conviction that it was constitutional, supported Section One in 
order “to incorporate into the Constitution provisions which will settle the doubt which some gentlemen 
entertain upon that question.”  Id. at 2511.  Additionally, about a month after the Amendment had 
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substantive federal guarantees, but cross-jurisdictional equality was not the 
principal focus of concern either.  Shellabarger’s bill received only perfunctory 
consideration and was never passed, while the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the 
subject of enormous attention and debate.  Overwhelmingly, the framers were 
concerned about discrimination by the states against their own citizens.  This was 
the focus of the Civil Rights Act, and speaker after speaker indicated that Section 
One simply constitutionalized the principles of that Act.  It is true many were 
vague as to the precise meaning of each clause in Section One, and in many 
particular passages in the debates one often cannot rule out Hamburger’s reading.  
But if the Privileges or Immunities Clause was simply a redundant recapitulation of 
the Comity Clause it is hard to see how it had the importance that the framers 
seemed to attribute to it.  Hamburger’s approach shifts the Amendment’s primary 
guarantee of equal rights onto the Equal Protection Clause—a reading that is in line 
with modern doctrine but that arguably erases that Clause’s original textual focus 
on protection. 
It is worth remembering how limited the scope of the Comity Clause was as a 
guarantee of the rights of free blacks not only for the defenders of slavery (such as 
Chief Justice Taney), but also for its opponents.  Justice Curtis, whose robust 
refutation of Taney in his dissenting opinion in Dred Scott elevated the idea of 
black citizenship to what Hamburger calls “a central antislavery position,”88 had a 
surprisingly limited view of the rights attendant upon that citizenship:  
To what citizens the elective franchise shall be confided, is a question to be 
determined by each State, in accordance with its own views of the necessities or 
expediencies of its condition. What civil rights shall be enjoyed by its citizens, and 
whether all shall enjoy the same, or how they may be gained or lost, are to be 
determined in the same way.  One [State] may confine the right of suffrage to 
white male citizens; another may extend it to colored persons and females; one 
may allow all persons above a prescribed age to convey property and transact 
business; another may exclude married women.89 
This is a remarkably cramped and indeed almost empty vision of citizenship.  
The states may allocate or withhold rights among their citizens precisely as they 
see fit, freely abridging them on the basis of race or gender.  Hamburger demonizes 
Justice Washington’s position as “racist” and lionizes Justice Curtis as articulating 
the vision of privileges and immunities of citizenship “which would eventually . . . 
                                                                                                     
already passed the House, Rep. Henry Van Aernam (R. N.Y.) stated that it gave “constitutional sanction 
and protection to the substantial guarantees of the civil rights bill.”  Id. at 3069.  Democrats who 
opposed the measure did so because they likewise understood it as embodying the principles of the Civil 
Rights Act.  See, e.g., id. at 2461 (remarks of Rep. William E. Finck (D. Ohio)) (arguing that necessity 
of adopting Section One showed that the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional); id. at 2506 (remarks of 
Charles A. Eldridge (D. Wis.)) (also arguing that the amendment  was an “admission” that the Civil 
Rights Act was unconstitutional); id. at 2467 (remarks of Rep. Benjamin M. Boyer (D. Pa.)) (“The first 
section embodies the principles of the civil rights bill . . . .”); id. at 2530 (remarks of Rep. Samuel J. 
Randall (D. Pa.) (“The first section proposes to make an equality in every respect between the two 
races . . . .”); id. at 2538 (remarks of Rep. Andrew J. Rogers (D. N.J.) (“[Section One] is no more nor 
less than an attempt to embody in the Constitution of the United States that outrageous and miserable 
civil rights bill . . . .”). 
 88. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 104. 
 89. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 583 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
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be secured in the Fourteenth Amendment.”90  Yet the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment cited Justice Washington far more than Justice Curtis.  Many of them 
evidently combined Curtis’s insistence on black citizenship with Washington’s 
claim that citizenship entails a broad and irreducible scope of substantive rights. 
2. Lash: The Bill of Rights 
In sharp contrast to Hamburger, Kurt Lash rejects the idea that the meaning of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is rooted in the 
Comity Clause of Article IV.  Instead, in Lash’s view, the term “privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States” refers to “rights expressly conferred by 
the Federal Constitution,” principally defined in the first eight amendments.91  The 
effect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was thus to nationalize those rights by 
making them applicable against the states.92  However, Lash rejects the use of the 
“incorporation” to describe this process, because he insists that the focus should be 
not “on the meaning of the texts when first added to the constitution in 1791” (at 
the time of ratification of the first ten amendments), but rather on “how the rights 
represented by these texts were understood in 1868” (at the time of the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment).93  Thus, paradoxically, while Lash endorses 
“original public meaning originalism,”94 he admits the possibility that the 
Fourteenth Amendment crystallized a transformation in the meaning of the rights 
protected through a process of nonoriginalist or common-law evolution.95 
In the first article of a three-part series exploring the origins of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, Lash begins by examining the usage of the terms 
“privileges” and “immunities” at the time of the founding.  Although in isolation 
these terms could be used interchangeably to refer to almost any sort of rights, Lash 
argues that the paired terms “privileges and immunities” referred to “rights 
belonging to a certain group of people or a particular institution.”96  The dominant 
understanding of Article IV’s protection of the “Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States” among antebellum judges and commentators was 
that it required only that states grant to out-of-state citizens “equal access to a 
limited set of state-protected rights.”97 In Corfield v. Coryell, 98 Justice Washington 
continued to adhere to this approach, although he read the set of protected rights 
more broadly than his predecessors, as including political rights.  Washington also 
referred to the class of protected rights as those “which are, in their nature, 
                                                                                                     
 90. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 97. 
 91. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1245. 
 92. See Lash, Beyond Incorporation, supra note 32, at 460. 
 93. Id. at 455. 
 94. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1247. 
 95. See Lash, Beyond Incorporation, supra note 32, at 456-59 (arguing, by way of example, that 
while examination of theological questions by the courts would have been acceptable at the time of the 
Founding, by the time of Reconstruction it was seen as a violation of the non-establishment principle). 
 96. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1257. 
 97. Id. at 1260.  As Lash observes, this was the approach taken in the leading early cases, including 
Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797), and Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 
1812). 
 98. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
46 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and 
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states.”99  But 
Lash argues that no court or commentator prior to the Civil War read Corfield as 
referring to a nationally mandated set of substantive rights—“[i]t was only after 
1865 that radical Republicans, and proponents of women’s suffrage,” took that 
position.100  Rather, courts continued to treat the Comity Clause as requiring equal 
access to a limited set of state-conferred rights, and the year after the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, the Supreme Court endorsed that view in Paul v. 
Virginia.101 
In contrast to Article IV’s “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several 
States,” which referred to state-conferred rights, Lash argues that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” refers to 
“rights conferred by the Federal Constitution.”102  Lash finds antecedents for the 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause in 
international treaties and implementing legislation.103  For example, the Louisiana 
Cession Act promised to extend to the inhabitants of Louisiana “all the rights, 
advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.”104  Likewise, the 
Adams-Onís Treaty guaranteed to the inhabitants of Florida “all the privileges, 
rights, and immunities, of the citizens of the United States,”105 and the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed to the inhabitants of Texas “all the rights of citizens 
of the United States.”106 
Of course, the language of these treaties is not exactly the same as the 
language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and varies from one treaty to the 
next.  Moreover, the context in which the treaties were framed is very different 
from the debates over civil rights during Reconstruction.  As Hamburger puts it, the 
cession treaties and the Reconstruction-era debates over privileges and immunities 
“involved different problems, texts and meanings.”107  Moreover, there is little 
reason to think that that the rights guaranteed to new citizens under the cession 
treaties were limited to federal constitutional rights; surely they also included rights 
under international law and federal statutory rights, as well as rights of citizens 
under territorial law, and once the territory was admitted to statehood, under state 
law, as early decisions confirm.108 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 551. 
 100. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1266. 
 101. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).  See Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1280.  As Lash 
notes, Chief Justice Taney’s theory of the Comity Clause in Dred Scott was also “quite conventional.”  
Id. at 1276 (discussing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1857)). 
 102. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1282. 
 103. See id. at 1285-87. 
 104. Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., art. III, Apr. 
30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200. 
 105. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, U.S.-Spain, art. VI, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252. 
 106. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., 
art. IX, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922. 
 107. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 106. 
 108. See, e.g., Desbois’ Case, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 285 (La. 1812) (right to practice law); U.S. v. Laverty, 26 
F. Cas. 875, 875-77 (C.C.D. La. 1812) (No. 15,569a) (immunity from restrictions imposed on alien 
enemies). 
2013] THE MAGIC MIRROR 47 
Lash finds support for his argument that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
refers specifically to federal constitutional rights in arguments made in Congress in 
1819 over a proposal by Representative James Tallmadge to condition the 
admission of Missouri on the gradual abolition of slavery.109  Opponents of this 
proposal argued, among other things, that it violated the Louisiana Cession 
Treaty’s promise of the “rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the 
United States,” on the theory that the citizens of the new state of Missouri should 
have the same right as the citizens of other states to institute slavery under their 
chosen republican institutions.110  Proponents, such as Daniel Webster and David 
Morill, retorted that the right to establish slavery depended on state law rather than 
the federal Constitution, and was therefore not protected by the treaty.111  Because 
both sides in this debate focused on federal constitutional rights, Lash concludes 
that they all “distinguished the national rights, privileges and immunities” 
guaranteed under the Cession Treaty “from the state-conferred rights, privileges, 
and immunities guarded under Article IV.”112 
It is not clear that this rather obscure debate sheds any light on the eventual 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Only a small part of the debate 
over the Tallmadge proposal focused on the clause in the cession treaty, which in 
any case was worded differently from the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The 
fact that the discussion of the cession treaty clause focused on federal constitutional 
rights is not surprising.  Missouri was not yet a state, so no rights under state law 
yet existed, much less issues involving sojourning citizens from out of state.  But as 
Lash himself points out, Webster’s and Morill’s discussions of federal 
constitutional rights involved “structural guarantees of federalism and access to 
federal courts,”113 not the guarantees of the first eight amendments. 
In the second article in his series, Lash explores the development of John 
Bingham’s ideas in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment and the reception 
of those ideas by Bingham’s colleagues in Congress.114  As Lash observes, 
“Bingham left a trail of conflicting statements regarding the meaning of Article IV, 
the nature of the Bill of Rights, and the relationship of both to the proposed 
Fourteenth Amendment.”115  While early in the debates of 1866 Bingham claimed 
that his proposed amendment was based on the Comity Clause, by 1871, well after 
the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified, he stated that the Amendment 
protected completely different rights than the Comity Clause, namely the rights 
guaranteed by the first eight amendments.116  While in 1866 Bingham treated the 
Comity Clause as part of the “bill of rights,” in 1871 he limited the “bill of rights” 
to the first eight amendments to the Constitution, more or less tracking the modern 
definition.117  While in 1866 he seemed to ignore or reject the doctrine of Barron v. 
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Baltimore, in 1871 he “described Barron as ‘rightfully’ decided.”118  
Because Bingham was the principal draftsman of Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, his views are important.  Unfortunately, as Lash 
recognizes, he was often less than fully clear and consistent.  To his credit, Lash 
seeks to explore and explain these inconsistencies, rather than to deny that they 
exist, as many originalist incorporationists have done. 
To assess Lash’s approach, it is useful first to survey Bingham’s contributions 
to the debates during and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Bingham first proposed a constitutional amendment on December 6, 1865, but it 
languished in committee for more than two months.  As eventually reported out in 
February 1866, Bingham’s amendment provided: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States 
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amendment).119 
This prototype of the Fourteenth Amendment, known as the “Bingham 
Amendment,” was extensively debated from February 26 to 28, 1866.  Bingham 
opened the debate by claiming that “[e]very word of the proposed amendment is to-
day in the Constitution of our country, save the words conferring the express grant 
of power upon the Congress of the United States.”120  This was of course not 
exactly true.  To substantiate his claim, Bingham specifically quoted the Article IV 
Comity Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; but curiously, the 
February proposal did not mention due process, and conversely, of course there 
was no equal protection provision in the antebellum Constitution.  Repeatedly in 
these early debates Bingham seemed to conflate the ideas of privileges and 
immunities, due process, and equal protection, making it difficult to discern 
precisely what meaning he attached to each of the three corresponding clauses in 
the final version.  He also claimed that the substantive requirements imposed by the 
new amendment—not just the Article IV obligations, but much more 
controversially those drawn from the Fifth Amendment (with the extra-textual 
gloss of equal protection)—were already binding on the states “by the very letter of 
the Constitution.”121   
Unfortunately, Bingham continued, it was well established “by every 
construction of the Constitution, . . . that these great provisions of the Constitution, 
this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested for its execution 
and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the States.”122  What did Bingham 
mean by this reference to the “bill of rights”?  The grammatical antecedent of the 
phrase “these great provisions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights” 
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appears to be the Article IV Comity Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause just quoted.123  In other words, when in February 1866 Bingham 
invoked “this immortal bill of rights” he appeared to refer to the Comity and Due 
Process Clauses, not the first eight (or ten) amendments.   
Those who assert that from beginning to end Bingham consistently and clearly 
advocated incorporation of the first eight amendments have scoffed at this idea, 
arguing that the term “bill of rights” must have meant in 1866 what it means 
today.124  But that is profoundly anachronistic.  In 1866 the term “bill of rights” had 
a wide range of meanings in constitutional discourse, not the fixed and uniform 
meaning it has today.  Before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court never used the term “bill of rights” to refer to the first eight (or ten) 
amendments, although it did repeatedly use the term to refer to the guarantees of 
Article I, Section 10 of the unamended Constitution.125  Joseph Story noted that 
that the opponents of the 1789-91 amendments argued that the unamended 
Constitution “itself, was, in every rational sense . . . a Bill of Rights for the 
Union.”126  In 1865, Senator Charles Sumner (R.-Mass.) referred to the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as “in itself alone a whole Bill of 
Rights.”127  In his influential Manual of the Constitution, which was exactly 
contemporaneous with the Fourteenth Amendment, Timothy Farrar uses the term 
“bill of rights” much more expansively, to refer to provisions in the 1789 
Constitution (such as the Contracts Clause, the Habeas Corpus Clause, and the 
Comity Clause) as well as various provisions in the 1791 amendments, although 
elsewhere he uses the term in its modern sense.128  On the other hand, we can also 
point to examples in the debates in Congress during the framing of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment, and in contemporary treatises, where the term “bill of rights” is used 
in its modern sense.129  Thus it is clear from contemporary sources that “bill of 
rights” did not have a fixed meaning, and that sometimes even the same writer can 
use the term to refer to different provisions in different contexts. 
When, after two days of debate, Bingham delivered the final speech on his 
proposal, he once again referred to “the provisions in the bill of rights, that the 
citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States in the several States, and that no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”130  Bingham also 
made clear that he read an extra-textual right of equal protection into the “bill of 
rights.”  He referred to “the bill of rights that all shall be protected alike in life, 
liberty and property” and twice later referred to “equal protection to life, liberty and 
property” or “equal protection . . . in the rights of life, liberty and property” as 
guaranteed by the existing “bill of rights.”131  Thus, although during this speech 
Bingham repeatedly invoked “the bill of rights” or “this sacred bill of rights” or 
“these provisions of the bill of rights,”132 he seemed clearly to include both the 
Comity Clause and an extra-textual right of “equal protection” in life, liberty and 
property in “the bill of rights.” He never made it entirely clear whether he included 
all of the first eight (or ten) amendments.   
Those who argue that Bingham understood his proposal to make the Bill of 
Rights (in the modern sense) applicable to the states point to a passage in this 
speech where Bingham observed that in Barron v. Baltimore and its progeny, the 
Supreme Court had repeatedly held that the first ten amendments “are not 
applicable to and do not bind the states.”133  But those amendments, Bingham 
insisted, “are nevertheless to be enforced and observed in States by the grand 
utterance of that immortal man, who, while he lived, stood alone in intellectual 
power among the living men of his country, and now that he is dead, sleeps alone 
in his honored tomb by the sounding sea.”134  Bingham then quoted at length from 
the “grand argument” of the “immortal” Daniel Webster to the effect that the 
Constitution was created by the people, not the states, that it imposes “injunctions 
and prohibitions” on the states, and that state legislators are required to swear to 
support it.135  These oaths were disregarded in the former slave states, Bingham 
concluded, and the “whole question” was “simply, whether you will give by this 
amendment to the people of the United States the power, by legislative enactment, 
to punish officials of States for violation of the oaths enjoined upon them by their 
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Constitution?”136 
What is one to make of this convoluted argument?  It may well be that 
Bingham believed that, despite Barron, the personal rights guaranteed in the first 
eight amendments were binding on the states, although the federal government had 
no power to enforce them.  And it seems likely that Bingham intended something 
like the protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to be made 
applicable to the states, although the text of his proposal did not yet contain the 
words “due process.”  Those who cite this speech as proof that Bingham intended 
to make all the personal guarantees of the first eight amendments enforceable 
against the states tend to argue that Bingham regarded them as included in (or 
coextensive with) the “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.”  
But if that is true, Bingham did not make himself clear, and based on the debates, it 
does not seem that his colleagues understood him.  Nor did Bingham explain why 
the guarantees of the first eight amendments, which generally protect the rights of 
all persons against violation by the federal government, should be extended only to 
citizens in the case of violation by the states.  In any case, Bingham failed to 
convince not only Democrats, but also moderate Republicans, and was forced to 
agree to the tabling of his proposal.137 
After the failure of the Bingham Amendment in February, the Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction again took up the task of drafting a constitutional amendment.  
On April 21, Thaddeus Stevens introduced in the Committee a five-part proposal 
drafted by the abolitionist and utopian socialist Robert Dale Owen,138 the first part 
of which declared that “[n]o discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the 
United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color or previous 
condition of servitude.”139 Later that day Bingham proposed to add the language 
that eventually became the second sentence of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.140 
In a puzzling series of votes over the course of the next week, this language 
was first approved, then removed and also rejected as a free-standing proposal, then 
adopted in place of the language originally proposed by Stevens.141 
Stevens and most other participants in the debates seemed to understand this 
language primarily as an antidiscrimination provision tracking the Civil Rights Act 
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of 1866.142  But Bingham evinced a much more idiosyncratic understanding.  
According to Bingham, the Amendment was needed to empower Congress “to 
protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the 
Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the 
same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.”143  
What were these privileges and immunities?  Perplexingly, Bingham stated that the 
elective franchise is “one of the privileges of a citizen of the Republic,” but “is 
exclusively under the control of the States,” so long as they do not violate the 
Article IV guarantee of a republican form of government.144  He suggested that the 
Amendment would enable Congress to furnish a remedy for state infliction of 
“cruel and unusual punishments.”145  And he maintained that the original Comity 
Clause of Article IV protected, among other privileges, “the right to bear true 
allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to be protected in 
life, liberty, and property.”146  We have here an indication, then, that Bingham 
regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating against the states at least 
some of the protections of the first eight amendments (notably the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause).  But he did not clearly indicate that all these 
amendments were incorporated, and his enumeration of covered rights included 
some derived from other constitutional provisions (the Republican Guarantee 
Clause) and others not clearly spelled out in the constitutional text (the right of 
protection by the government, the right “to bear true allegiance to the 
Constitution”).  He still did not make a clear distinction here between the Comity 
Clause’s “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States” and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States.” Rather, he continued confusingly to conflate the two. 
Although Bingham’s statements during the 1866 debates often seem vague and 
ambiguous, some of his later statements referred more clearly to incorporation.  In 
1867, during a debate on a bill to prohibit flogging, he alluded to the Barron 
doctrine, under which the “personal rights” in “the first ten articles of amendment” 
(such as the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment) limited Congress only, but could 
not be enforced by Congress against the states.147  Bingham indicated that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, once ratified, would change this situation, making these 
provisions binding on the states and empowering Congress to enforce them.148 
Oddly, though, in this speech he cited only the Equal Protection Clause, not the 
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Privileges or Immunities Clause, as the vehicle for incorporation.149 
However, in early 1871, Bingham presented a report on behalf of the House 
Judiciary Committee that seems completely inconsistent with incorporation.  This 
report urged rejection of a petition by Victoria Woodhull calling for the federal 
protection of women’s suffrage as a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United 
States under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Committee could simply have taken 
the position that Bingham and other proponents of the Amendment had taken in 
1866, namely that the elective franchise is not one of the privileges or immunities 
protected by Section One.  Instead, the Committee went much further, stating that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause “does not, in the opinion of the committee, 
refer to privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States other than those 
privileges and immunities embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article 
4, section 2.”150   
Yet just two months later, during the debates over the Ku Klux Klan Bill, 
Bingham endorsed incorporation much more clearly than he had ever done 
before.151  In those debates, Samuel Shellabarger defended the constitutionality of 
provisions in the Klan Bill prohibiting private acts of terrorism by relying on the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which he evidently 
understood as nationalizing the natural or inherent rights protected by the Comity 
Clause as explicated in Corfield v. Coryell.152  John Farnsworth did not dispute 
Shellabarger’s basic reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but argued that 
the bill went beyond Congress’ enforcement power because it reached purely 
private action.153   
In response to Farnsworth, Bingham defended the constitutionality of the Bill, 
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but he also rejected Shellabarger’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.  For the first time, Bingham explained why he had abandoned the language 
debated in February 1866 (“The Congress shall have power to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper to secure to citizens of each State all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several States”) in favor of the language 
eventually adopted in June (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”).  After the 
struggle in February, Bingham explained, he reread the opinion of Chief Justice 
Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore,154 and “noted and apprehended as [he] never did 
before, certain words in that opinion.”155  In Barron, Marshall stated that if the 
framers had intended the first eight amendments to limit the states, they would have 
inserted specific words to that effect, as the framers of the original Constitution had 
done in prefacing the prohibitions of Article I, Section 10 with the words “No State 
shall.”156  Therefore, Bingham explained, in his revised text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment he began with those same words.157  Furthermore, Bingham explained 
that “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as 
contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States,” which he then proceeded to 
quote in full.158  Bingham insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment secures “other 
and different privileges and immunities” than the Comity Clause of Article IV, as 
construed by antebellum courts and commentators.159   
Thus in this 1871 speech Bingham finally stated quite clearly (much more 
clearly than he ever had during the framing and ratification in 1866-68) that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause served principally to 
make the guarantees of the first eight amendments applicable to the states.  At the 
same time, Bingham’s new explanation suggests that his first proposal, which 
exactly tracked the language of the Comity Clause, could not have been understood 
to effect incorporation.   
Was Bingham’s 1871 speech an accurate characterization of his views in 1866, 
or was he simply trying to impose some coherence on his earlier inchoate 
statements?  James Garfield (the future President, who served as a Republican 
Congressman from Ohio from 1863 to 1880) was skeptical.  Garfield was present 
throughout the debate in 1866 and had recently “read over, with scrupulous care, 
every word of it as recorded in the Globe.”160  As he said to Bingham, “My 
colleague can make but he cannot unmake history.”161  Moreover, as another 
Republican, Horatio C. Burchard of Illinois, was quick to point out, by 1871 
Bingham’s views on the Amendment had clearly shifted: he was now evidently 
willing to support federal legislation reaching purely private conduct, an idea he 
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had expressly repudiated in 1866.162  Burchard discussed three possible 
interpretations of the privileges or immunities clause: (1) that it protected a limited 
set of rights, such as the rights protected in the Civil Rights Act of 1866; (2) that it 
protected a broader set of rights as outlined in Corfield (Shellabarger’s position); or 
(3) that it protected specifically those rights listed in the first eight amendments 
(Bingham’s current claim).163  Of the three positions, Burchard noted, Bingham’s 
current stance made the least sense as an argument in support of the Ku Klux Klan 
bill, because the rights protected in the first eight amendments were not general 
guarantees of “life and personal security” but merely “specific limitations, relating 
to the mode of procedure or jurisdiction” in criminal cases.164  As this debate 
shows, by 1871 a wide range of views still existed about the meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause among its Republican supporters. 
Unlike many originalist incorporationist scholars, who have implausibly 
argued that Bingham’s views were completely consistent throughout this period, 
Lash admits that Bingham was inconsistent and argues that this inconsistency 
“reflects a change of mind—an epiphany,”165 which led Bingham to abandon his 
earlier draft tracking the language of the Comity Clause (“privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several States”) in favor of the final version 
(“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”).  By this change of 
language, Lash argues, Bingham sought to protect the personal rights listed in the 
first eight amendments to the federal Constitution, but not “common law civil 
rights” or “a broad range of unenumerated individual natural rights.”166 
Unfortunately, Lash’s argument about Bingham’s “epiphany” does not 
completely account for all of Bingham’s inconsistencies or for the extent to which 
his constitutional theories were not fully thought out.  Lash argues that Bingham 
drew a “critical” distinction between the “natural rights of all persons” and the 
particular “rights of United States citizens.”167  Thus, the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect the former, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
protects the latter.  But Bingham did not always consistently adhere to this 
distinction.  For example, in his final speech of February 28, 1866 on his first 
proposal, he referred to the right of equal protection in life, liberty and property 
both as a right of “persons” and a right of “citizens.”168  Moreover, with the 
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possible exception of the Second Amendment,169 the first eight amendments do 
protect the rights of all persons, not just citizens: the word “person” or “people” 
occurs in the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, while the word “citizen” 
does not appear there at all.  If Bingham understood the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to make the rights in the first eight amendments applicable against the 
states, he never explained why those rights should protect all “persons” against the 
federal government, but should protect only “citizens” against the states.170   
Bingham also maintained throughout the debates that “the franchise of a 
Federal elective office is as clearly one of the privileges of a citizen of the United 
States as is the elective franchise for choosing Representatives in Congress or 
presidential electors.  They are both provided for and guarantied in your 
Constitution.”171  But he insisted that even under the Fourteenth Amendment “the 
exercise of the elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of 
the Republic, is exclusively under the control of the States.”172  Bingham had in 
fact opposed the Civil Rights Bill as “oppressive” and “unjust” because it 
prohibited “discrimination in civil rights,” which he insisted included the elective 
franchise, and he attacked its proponents for claiming the franchise was not 
included.173  Yet he engaged in similar inconsistency himself with respect to the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, by admitting that the elective franchise was a 
privilege of national citizenship, yet denying that the Clause prohibited its 
abridgement. 
Lash recognizes that Bingham’s early invocations in the debates in February 
1866 of the “bill of rights” referred not to the first eight amendments (as other 
incorporationist scholars have maintained), but to the Comity Clause of Article IV 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.174  But he argues that this 
“idiosyncratic view”175 would have mystified Bingham’s colleagues: “no one else, 
in or outside Congress, appears to have shared Bingham’s view that Article IV was 
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part of the Bill of Rights.”176   
Even more confusing than his shifting textual references to the “bill of rights” 
were Bingham’s effusive statements regarding extra-textual privileges and 
immunities.  Lash argues that “Bingham’s focus on textually recognized rights 
allowed him to avoid the undue expansion of federal power by carefully limiting 
Congress’s enforcement power to those rights already expressly guaranteed in the 
Constitution.”177 It is true that Bingham repeatedly claimed throughout the debates 
that his proposed amendment imposed no new obligation “which is not now 
enjoined upon them by the very letter of the Constitution.”178  This might have 
been a useful argument in convincing moderate or conservative Republicans who 
were concerned about radical change.  But Bingham’s claim was obviously not 
true.  Neither the language of Bingham’s amendment, nor his understanding of it, 
simply recapitulated textually recognized rights.   
The antebellum Constitution contained no equal protection provision.  
Moreover, Bingham often equated the privileges and immunities of citizens with 
natural rights, and in defining them did not limit himself to the constitutional text 
but brought in a wide range of unenumerated rights.  As early as 1859, in an 
extensive argument that racially discriminatory provisions in the proposed Oregon 
constitution violated the Comity Clause, Bingham said: 
The equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue and to utter, 
according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their toil, is the rock on 
which that Constitution rests—its sure foundation and defense. . . . Before your 
constitution, sir, as it is, as I trust it ever will be, all men are sacred, whether white 
or black, rich or poor, strong or weak, wise or simple.  Before its divine rule of 
justice and equality of natural rights, Lazarus in his rags is as sacred as the rich 
man clothed in purple and fine linen; the peasant in his hovel, as sacred as the 
prince in his palace, or the king on his throne.179 
Bingham’s florid natural rights rhetoric and his willingness to read 
unenumerated rights into the Constitution were at war with any claim that he 
sought carefully to limit the Amendment to “those rights already expressly 
guaranteed.”180 
The crux of Lash’s argument is that by substituting for the language debated in 
February 1866 (“privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states”) the 
language debated in the House in April and ultimately adopted in the Fourteenth 
Amendment (“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”), Bingham 
sought to make clear that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected not Comity 
Clause rights as interpreted in cases like Corfield, but rather the rights protected by 
the first eight amendments.181  As early as January 1866, Bingham indicated that he 
viewed the Comity Clause as protecting rights of national rather than state 
citizenship.  He parsed its language as follows: “‘The citizens of each State (being 
ipso facto citizens of the United States) shall be entitled to all the privileges and 
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immunities of citizens (supplying the ellipsis ‘of the United States’) in the several 
States.’”182 In Lash’s view, Bingham’s first proposal used the exact language of the 
Comity Clause, because under Bingham’s “ellipsis” theory, the Comity Clause 
protected “the ‘privileges and immunities (of citizens of the United States) in the 
several states’—a set of rights which Bingham insisted included only the Bill of 
Rights.”183  The problem was, as the debates in February revealed, “Bingham’s 
‘ellipsis’ theory of Article IV was so odd and idiosyncratic, it appears that no other 
Republican followed his argument.”184  Instead, Bingham’s Republican colleagues 
generally read the Comity Clause language through the traditional lens of the case 
law as protecting an open-ended set of fundamental common law civil rights (as 
specified in state law), such as the rights of property and contract.185  Lash argues 
that while radical Republicans favored nationalizing the protection of all civil 
rights, conservatives and moderates (including Bingham), whose votes were 
needed for the two-thirds supermajority, rejected such an approach as an undue 
extension of federal power.186   
His colleagues’ incomprehension thus forced Bingham to withdraw his 
original proposal, and, Lash argues, triggered an “epiphany” which led him to 
abandon reliance on the Comity Clause and “to make a critical change in his 
proposed constitutional text.”187  In the second draft, “Bingham abandoned the 
language of Article IV and instead embraced the previously unstated ‘ellipsis.’”188  
By the change in language, Lash argues, Bingham sought to ensure that his 
Amendment would be understood as protecting the Bill of Rights.189  Thus Lash 
accepts Bingham’s 1871 statements during the Ku Klux Klan Act debate—in 
which Bingham tacitly conceded that his “original reading of Article IV was 
incorrect,”190 and that the redrafted Privileges or Immunities Clause “protected a 
completely different set of rights than those protected under Article IV,” namely 
the rights guaranteed “in the first eight amendments to the Constitution”191—as an 
accurate account of Bingham’s views during the debates in April and May of 1866, 
after his supposed “epiphany” had taken place.192 
The difficulty with this argument is that Bingham continued to conflate 
references to the “bill of rights” with references to the Comity Clause right up to 
very end of the debates in May, just as he had done earlier in February.  In his very 
last speech in the House on the Fourteenth Amendment, delivered minutes before 
the final vote, just after complaining about state infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishments,” Bingham invoked the Comity Clause: 
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Sir, the words of the Constitution that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States” include, among 
other privileges, the right to bear true allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of 
the United States, and to be protected in life, liberty, and property.193 
Bingham then quoted from the South Carolina Nullification Ordinance of 
1833, which empowered the legislature to punish any citizen of the state who bore 
allegiance to any government but the state’s.194  Unfortunately, he lamented, 
Congress lacked the power to restrain South Carolina from punishing its own 
citizens for bearing allegiance to the federal government, even though the 
Ordinance clearly violated the Comity Clause.195  Fortunately, however, the 
missing power “is supplied by the first section of this amendment.”196 
These were Bingham’s final words on Section One before it was passed by the 
House.  If he had really undergone an “epiphany” that caused him to discard his 
original reading of Article IV and abjure any equation between the privileges and 
immunities of the Comity Clause and those protected in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, why did he continue to focus on the Comity Clause in his very last 
statement before the Amendment was adopted?  Why did he continue to claim right 
up to the very end of the debates that the Fourteenth Amendment would empower 
Congress to enforce Comity Clause rights?   
Moreover, speaker after speaker in the House had stated that Section One 
merely constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act, a position perfectly consistent with 
the view that the Comity Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, with their 
very similar language, referred to the same set of basic rights.  If Bingham truly 
believed in April and May of 1866, as Lash contends, that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause “protected a completely different set of rights” than the Comity 
Clause, is it really plausible that he would not only fail to correct his colleagues, 
but that he would himself rely on the Comity Clause in his final defense of Section 
One? 
Lash struggles valiantly to make sense of Bingham and has contributed much 
to our understanding of the complex evolution of his thought.  He rightly rejects the 
efforts of other incorporationist originalists to impose a Procrustean consistency on 
Bingham’s idiosyncratic statements.197  But his “epiphany” hypothesis is ultimately 
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unconvincing.  By 1871, well after ratification, Bingham was quite clear that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protected all the rights in the first eight 
amendments and did not refer to the same rights as the Comity Clause.  However, 
up to the very moment that the House passed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 
he was much more ambiguous.  He repeatedly invoked the “bill of rights” and even 
specific textual guarantees found in the first eight amendments, such as the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.  Yet he also invoked in his 
references to the “bill of rights” or “privileges and immunities” textual guarantees 
outside the first eight amendments, such as the Comity Clause, the elective 
franchise (although paradoxically he did not regard it is protected by Section One), 
as well as extra-textual rights, including equal protection, “the right to bear true 
allegiance” to the national government, and perhaps also “the right to live,” the 
“right to know,” “the right to work and enjoy the product of their toil.”198 
Lash argues that the required two-thirds majorities of both houses of the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress would not support an amendment that was understood to 
protect citizens against discrimination by their own states in the fundamental 
common law rights that were the focus of the Comity Clause.199  Yet Congress had 
done just that by statute in the Civil Rights Act, enacting it by supermajorities and 
overriding President Johnson’s veto.  Bingham, of course, voted against the Civil 
Rights Act, but that merely demonstrates just how conservative and how isolated 
among his Republican colleagues he was.  Invocation of the “bill of rights” may 
have been a powerful rhetorical tool in the debates, but the main concern expressed 
by Republicans who supported the Amendment was the discrimination in state law 
civil rights of property, contract, mobility, right to work, personal safety, and 
access to the courts—the very rights that the Comity Clause had protected 
interjurisdictionally, and that the Civil Rights Act protected intrajurisdictionally.  It 
seems only natural that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause would have been widely understood as prohibiting states from engaging in 
racial discrimination with respect to these same rights, which is exactly the 
understanding of the clause that many participants in the 1866 debates expressed.200 
The third and final article in Lash’s series focuses on the 1866 election 
campaign as the key to the original public meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.201  The debates in Congress provide confusing and often contradictory 
evidence of the Amendment’s original meaning, and the scanty or nonexistent 
records of the ratification debates in the state legislatures offer little clarification.202  
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The solution to this conundrum, Lash argues, is to look at the election for evidence 
of the original meaning.  Lash starts with historian Eric Foner’s statement that 
“[m]ore than anything else, the election became a referendum on the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”203 
Foner’s own discussion of the debates in Congress, the state legislatures, and 
the electoral campaign, however, suggests that the search for a precise “original 
meaning” of Section One may be misguided.  Foner explains that, in Congress, 
“compared with the now-forgotten disqualification and representation clauses, the 
first section inspired relatively little discussion.”204  Moreover,  
Republicans did not deny one Democrat’s description of the Amendment as “open 
to ambiguity and . . .  conflicting constructions” . . . On the precise definition of 
equality before the law, Republicans differed among themselves.  Even moderates, 
however, understood Reconstruction as a dynamic process, in which phrases like 
“privileges and immunities” were subject to changing interpretation. They 
preferred to allow both Congress and the federal courts maximum flexibility in 
implementing the Amendment’s provisions . . . .205 
Likewise, in Foner’s account, debates over the Fourteenth Amendment during the 
election of 1866 focused largely on the representation and disqualification 
clauses.206 
Lash’s own account of these public debates does not clearly show that the 
main focus was on protection of rights constitutionally enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights.  In the summer of 1866, he observes, Republican advocates of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “dealt in vague generalities.”207  Many “expressly tied 
Section I . . . to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”208  Republicans generally “avoided 
specifics in regard to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, preferring instead to 
stress the general rights of due process and equality under law.”209 
Lash’s main evidence regarding the original public meaning of Section One 
during ratification focuses on the reactions to the police-led riots in Memphis in 
May and in New Orleans in July 1866, in which dozens of blacks, unionists and 
Republicans were massacred.210  Lash argues that during the months leading up to 
the election, and in its immediate aftermath, many loyalists and Republicans 
viewed these events as abridgements of the rights of free speech and assembly, 
demonstrating the need for ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.211  After the 
crushing Republican electoral victory, President Johnson proposed an alternate 
version of the Fourteenth Amendment that would have retained the Citizenship, 
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Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, but would have replaced the clause 
protecting the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” with a 
simple restatement of the language of Article IV’s Comity Clause.212  This counter-
amendment and the Republicans’ rejection of it demonstrate, in Lash’s view, that 
both sides understood the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause as protecting enumerated constitutional rights but not unenumerated natural 
rights.213 
Unfortunately, the implications of this history are far more ambiguous than 
Lash maintains.  The police-led massacres in Memphis and New Orleans were not 
examples of the states “making” or “enforcing” laws abridging the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States.  They were not, in fact, based on any 
legal authority, and are thus better understood as deprivations of life, liberty and 
property without due process of law and gross breaches of the duty to provide equal 
protection of the law. Therefore, Republican arguments that adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was needed to prevent such abuses do not tell us much 
about the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
It is true that Republicans referred to the freedom of speech, press, and 
assembly in discussing these events.  But those rights were understood as natural 
rights and not just rights enumerated in the First Amendment.  There is little 
evidence that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause to protect non-natural rights enumerated in the Constitution, 
such as the criminal and civil procedural protections found in the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Amendments.  If the Fourteenth Amendment had been widely understood 
to make all of the guarantees of the first eight amendments of the federal 
Constitution applicable to the states, one would certainly have expected discussion 
of that fact, especially when it would have required changes in existing practices in 
criminal and civil procedure.  Yet, at the time the Amendment was adopted, many 
states did not require indictment by grand jury, or trial by petit jury in all criminal 
prosecutions or in all civil actions at common law where the amount in controversy 
exceeded twenty dollars.214  The nineteenth-century trend in the states toward 
abolition not only of the grand jury, but also of the privilege against self-
incrimination, was unaffected by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.215  
As one scholar has observed, if the Amendment had been widely understood to 
make such provisions of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments applicable to 
the states, one would expect “that the issue would have been discussed”; yet “[t]he 
historical record contains only silence.”216 
At the same time, no one seems to have argued that the Fourteenth 
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Amendment did not protect natural rights not specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution.  Against the background of public discussions largely identifying the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act, and the broad natural rights 
rhetoric often deployed by Bingham and many others, this fact seems critical.  Of 
course, Lash argues that the change in language from Bingham’s first draft, which 
tracks the language of the Comity Clause (“privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several states”) to his second draft (“privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States”) was meant to exclude unenumerated rights.  Yet he also argues that 
the privileges or immunities protected in the final version include Comity Clause 
rights.  The final draft thus seems broader, not narrower, than the initial one.  If the 
language of the first version could be understood to protect unenumerated natural 
rights, why not also the language of the final version?  If unenumerated natural 
rights were excluded, surely we would expect clearer discussion of that fact. 
Finally, Lash cites President Johnson’s statements as proof that all sides 
understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause as referring exclusively to 
enumerated constitutional rights.  When Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, he asked: “Can it be reasonably supposed that [the freed slaves] possess the 
requisite qualifications to entitle them to all the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States?”217  As Lash observes, this is the first appearance in 
the 1866 debates of the phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States,” which would later become part of the Fourteenth Amendment.218  But 
Johnson did not make clear what he meant by that phrase.  He did not connect it in 
any way with the Bill of Rights, which, after all, protects the rights of all persons, 
not just citizens. The phrase “Citizen of the United States” in the antebellum 
Constitution occurs only in reference to the qualifications for federal office.219  
Johnson’s fears seemed to center on the potential exercise of civic rights by blacks, 
such as the elective franchise and the franchise of office, because he complained 
about “discrimination against large numbers of intelligent, worthy and patriotic 
foreigners, and in favor of the negro” when the latter is “less informed as to the 
nature and character of our institutions.”220   
In early 1867 Johnson proposed an alternative to the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Johnson’s counterproposal, as Lash puts it, “erased the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause and replaced it with a passive restatement of Article IV’s Comity Clause,” 
while retaining the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment .221  Lash claims that this episode proves that Johnson understood the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting enumerated rights only.  But it does 
not show how Johnson understood the Clause, much less that a common 
understanding of the Clause existed.  Johnson could have rejected the Clause 
because he saw it as protecting unenumerated natural rights, enumerated rights, or 
some combination thereof.  Andrew Johnson may well have opposed it for the 
same reason that Reverdy Johnson opposed it in the Senate: “simply because I do 
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not understand what will be the effect of that.”222  It is entirely probable that he had 
no very clear theory of its meaning, but opposed it because he saw it as somehow 
embodying the Republican and Radical principles of his enemies. 
B. ABSTRACT ORIGINALISM  
1. Calabresi: A Conservative Fourteenth Amendment 
Recently, Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert have questioned the prevailing 
judicial and scholarly consensus that originalism cannot justify the current 
constitutional prohibition of sex discrimination.223  Their argument proceeds as 
follows.  “[O]riginalists ought to begin and end all analysis with the original public 
meaning of constitutional texts.”224  However, they maintain that this does not 
require us to determine what the enacting Congress thought the text meant; indeed, 
“Congress often enacts texts into law without understanding what those texts 
mean” and has “great incentives to legislate ambiguously in order to please most of 
the people, most of the time.”225  Nevertheless, relying on a few selected statements 
of the framers, ratifiers, and early interpreters, Calabresi and Rickert conclude that 
“the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it bans all 
systems of caste and of class-based lawmaking.”226  While they concede that the 
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not generally recognize sex 
discrimination as a form of caste, they insist that “[t]he question of whether sex 
discrimination was (or was not) a form of caste was purely a question of fact,”227 
and observe that some nineteenth-century feminist writers did analogize between 
the two.228  Finally, they argue that the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment 
resolved the factual question that the Fourteenth Amendment (in their view) left 
open.  Once the Nineteenth Amendment gave “women the right to vote it became 
implausible to read the no-caste rule of the Fourteenth Amendment as allowing 
discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to civil rights.”229  Thus, “the 
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment permanently changed the way in which the 
Fourteenth Amendment ought to be read.”230  The authors conclude that “[t]he 
original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, when read in light of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, renders sex discrimination as to civil rights 
unconstitutional.”231  
Almost every move in this argument is highly questionable.  If originalist 
argument must begin and end with the original public meaning of constitutional 
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texts, it is curious that Calabresi and Rickert are unwilling to state precisely which 
text forms the basis of the anticaste principle.  As they note, the text does not use 
the terms “caste” or “class discrimination,” and the framers “were, for the most 
part, vexingly silent on the independent operation of Section One’s clauses.”232  
The prohibition of caste and class legislation, they argue, might be found in the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause, or some 
combination of the two.233  The historical record is unclear, and they are unwilling 
to commit to a specific answer.  Indeed, they are remarkably insouciant about the 
specific public meaning of individual clauses: “Fortunately, settling which clause 
or combination of clauses the Framers and contemporary readers of Section One 
understood to prohibit unequal legislation is not necessary to our argument.”234 
Yet if the text itself is not specifically framed in terms of an anticaste principle, 
and the understanding of the enacting Congress is not dispositive because Congress 
often does not understand what it is doing, how do we know that the original public 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it bans all systems of caste and of 
class-based lawmaking?  Calabresi and Rickert cite various statements by 
proponents of the Amendment, most notably Senator Howard, that it would do 
away with caste and class legislation.235  But of course, a fuller account of the 
legislative history would disclose many other possible understandings of the 
Amendment’s main provisions.  As discussed above, many proponents of Section 
One argued that it simply recapitulated the protections of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.236  Much of the framers’ discussion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
seems to focus, as Hamburger has argued, on Comity Clause rights.237  Much of the 
discussion of the Equal Protection Clause is consistent, as Christopher Green has 
argued, with a narrow focus on the purely protective functions of government, 
rather than a broad prohibition of all types of discriminatory legislation.238  
Calabresi and Rickert do not attempt a detailed justification of their selection of a 
handful of particular statements from the legislative history as establishing the 
original public meaning.  Indeed, if, as they claim, “it is the public understanding of 
the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment that establishes its original public 
meaning,”239 the paucity of references to the anticaste principle during ratification 
would seem to be a devastating difficulty.  They cite very few specific references to 
such a principle during ratification, and concede that “it is impossible to know how 
often the Amendment’s anticaste rule was discussed in state legislatures or how 
many legislators were consciously aware of its existence.”240   
While embracing Senator Howard’s statement that the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits caste and class legislation as an authoritative exposition of its original 
public meaning, Calabresi and Rickert simply dismiss or ignore the statements of 
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leading proponents, such as Howard, Stevens, Bingham, and many others, that it 
would not require equal treatment of women as irrelevant to the Amendment’s 
meaning.241  They freely concede that the Amendment’s congressional proponents 
almost universally maintained that it did not require gender equality.242  But they 
insist that this fact is relevant only to the expected application of the anticaste 
principle and not to its meaning.243    
Calabresi and Rickert never adequately justify this critical move.  Arguably, 
the framers’ statements on gender establish that the original meaning of the 
anticaste principle itself was narrower than the one they favor.  As Jack Balkin has 
put it, their approach “begs the question whether the adopters’ views and 
statements of purpose and principle involve mistakes about facts, or actually 
demonstrate disagreements with our present-day judgments about values.  That 
might be so because interpretive judgments often mingle factual and normative 
premises together.”244  
Calabresi and Rickert’s insistence that the framers’ discussions of gender 
equality may be disregarded because they are irrelevant to original meaning is 
arbitrary and unsupported.  Indeed, all scholars of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
in agreement that Section One was principally designed to prohibit certain forms of 
racial discrimination.  How do we know this, when Section One does not mention 
the word “race”?  Because the legislative history makes clear that this was the 
principal intended application.  Yet on what grounds can we accept evidence of 
expected applications indicating that race was covered and yet reject it when it 
indicates that gender was not covered? 
Calabresi and Rickert’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a ban 
on caste and class legislation raises vast problems that they do not adequately 
explore.  They claim that “[c]lass legislation and caste were often used 
interchangeably by those who contemplated the Fourteenth Amendment.”245  In 
fact, their own evidence shows that while the terms were often used together, they 
were not interchangeable.  Dictionary definitions and other contemporary sources 
clearly establish that in the nineteenth century (as today) the primary meaning of 
“caste” referred to the Hindu caste system, but the word could also be applied to 
orders of society, while the term “class” was much broader, potentially referring to 
any social division or grouping.246 
Calabresi and Rickert prefer to focus on caste, the narrower of the two terms.  
Astonishingly, they claim that “[l]ooking first to the original caste system, that of 
India, we find that in its earliest sense, the term caste was an apt description of the 
status of women.”247  This is flatly incorrect, and they concede that “[s]ex and caste 
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were not identical.”248  The term “caste” has a very specific historical content.  It 
refers to hereditary social divisions in Hindu society characterized by endogamy, 
commensality, and craft-exclusiveness.249  Such a term could easily be extended to 
race in American society, but is rather more difficult to extend to gender, except in 
the most metaphorical sense.  Race was hereditary in that the offspring of blacks 
were considered black; gender is not hereditary in the same sense, in that the 
offspring of women are not necessarily women.  Racial endogamy and 
commensality were also enforced through miscegenation and segregation laws; the 
opposite was the case with gender.  “Caste” might be readily analogized to the 
modern constitutional concept of “discrete and insular minorities,”250 while, as has 
often been observed, women are neither insular nor a minority.  Certainly, one may 
draw analogies between caste and gender, or between race and gender, as 
nineteenth-century feminists often did.  Indeed, Calabresi and Rickert cite one 
nineteenth-century feminist who wrote of the “caste of sex,” stating that “[m]en are 
the Brahmins, women the Pariahs, under our existing civilization.”251  But it is not 
clear that these references are more than an analogy or a metaphor.  Gender 
discrimination is like caste discrimination or race discrimination in certain respects 
(particularly in confining women to certain roles and occupations), but that is not 
the same as saying that gender discrimination is caste discrimination. 
If the term “caste” is arguably too narrow to comfortably include gender, the 
term “class” is much broader.  Calabresi and Rickert focus primarily on “caste,” 
perhaps because the term “class” is too broad for their purposes.  The term “class 
legislation” as used in nineteenth-century legal discourse could refer to any special-
interest legislation.252  For the Jacksonian Democrats, who crystallized opposition 
to class legislation, the creation of the Second Bank of the United States was the 
paradigmatic case of class legislation.253  As embraced by nineteenth-century 
courts, legal commentators and political actors of all stripes, “class legislation” 
could refer to any law singling out an individual or group for special benefits 
without adequately promoting the general welfare.254  The difficulty with such a 
doctrine from a modern perspective, as Melissa Saunders has pointed out, is that it 
is very difficult to distinguish laws improperly singling out groups for special 
benefits from those that promote the general welfare: a broad prohibition of class 
legislation in this nineteenth-century sense thus seems flatly incompatible with 
“modern political theory’s teaching that the democratic process is nothing but a 
struggle between competing interest groups.”255  Judicial enforcement of such a 
broad principle would revolutionize constitutional law and empower courts to 
invalidate almost any legislation, with unpredictable results.  Unsurprisingly, while 
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Calabresi and Rickert do not exactly repudiate this principle, they do not embrace it 
either.256  Yet surely, if the central meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it 
bans caste or class legislation, its potentially unlimited sweep is a serious problem 
that they ought to have addressed. 
Finally, it is unclear why, from an originalist perspective, the adoption of the 
Nineteenth Amendment alters the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
sex discrimination.257  The Nineteenth Amendment prohibits sex discrimination 
with respect to the right to vote.  Calabresi and Rickert argue that it is irrational to 
prohibit sex discrimination in political rights, but not in ordinary civil rights.258  
Yet from an originalist perspective, it is not clear why unconstitutionality follows 
from irrationality.  The framers of the Nineteenth Amendment knew that the 
Supreme Court had declined to read the Fourteenth Amendment as a general 
prohibition of sex discrimination, yet they failed to enact such a general 
prohibition.   
Anticipating this objection, Calabresi and Rickert argue that the Court had 
never specifically held that the Fourteenth Amendment permitted sex 
discrimination,259 suggesting perhaps that a broader subsequent constitutional 
prohibition of sex discrimination was unnecessary.  However, as they recognize, 
the Court was squarely presented in Bradwell v. Illinois260 with the argument that 
sex discrimination violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and chose to ignore it.  In 
Bradwell, the majority, following Slaughter-House, rejected Myra Bradwell’s 
claim for admission to the bar on the ground that the practice of law was not one of 
the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.261  Yet 
Justice Bradley, who had dissented in Slaughter-House, urging a broad scope for 
the Fourteenth Amendment much more in line with modern originalist views,262 did 
specifically hold that it permitted sex discrimination.263  Bradley denied that “it is 
one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens to engage in any and 
every profession, occupation, or employment in civil life.”264  Rather, “[t]he 
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices 
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.”265  In light of this and similar 
decisions, the need for a constitutional amendment to prohibit sex discrimination 
generally was clear.   
The Nineteenth Amendment, however, only addressed women’s suffrage, not 
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women’s rights generally. That was the most that was politically feasible at the 
time.  Its own proponents did not understand it to prohibit sex discrimination 
generally, and began almost immediately to campaign for a broader provision in 
the form of the Equal Rights Amendment.266  It is certainly true that supporters of 
the Nineteenth Amendment sought full equality for women and sought to build on 
the legacy of the Reconstruction Amendments, but as Calabresi and Rickert 
concede, “the very people responsible for guaranteeing women the vote did not 
think that the Constitution prohibited sex discrimination as to civil rights.”267 
Calabresi and Rickert claim simply to be “following Justice Scalia’s 
methodology completely”268 with regard to ascertainment of the original public 
meaning of the Constitution.  Yet they argue that the proper application of this 
methodology leads to the conclusion that Justice Ginsburg was right and Justice 
Scalia was wrong in the VMI case, the Court’s most important recent decision on 
sex discrimination.269  Justice Scalia would certainly be surprised by Calabresi and 
Rickert’s claim that they are following his methodology.  Scalia’s approach to 
originalism is fundamentally static.  It accords primacy to “those constant and 
unbroken national traditions that embody the people’s understanding of ambiguous 
constitutional texts.”270  Thus, under Scalia’s approach, if there is an unbroken 
tradition of state-supported single sex education, it cannot violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  After all, the Amendment’s text is ambiguous in that it completely 
fails to specify exactly which forms of discrimination are prohibited.   
Calabresi and Rickert disagree with Justice Scalia, but they also crucially 
disagree with each other on the application of this ambiguous constitutional text.  
Indeed, Calabresi’s approach is only slightly less static than Scalia’s.  For 
Calabresi, the Nineteenth Amendment is critical to the recognition of sex 
discrimination as a form of caste, and therefore only race and sex discrimination 
are prohibited.271  Rickert would allow the courts to recognize other forms of caste 
discrimination.272 
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In a second recent article (coauthored with Andrea Matthews),273 Calabresi 
applies similar methods while purporting to deploy “Scalia-style originalism”274 to 
defend the result in Loving v. Virginia,275 which struck down a ban on interracial 
marriage.  Again, this is a “Scalia-style originalism” that has little in common with 
Scalia’s own presumption of constitutionality for longstanding practices not 
unambiguously prohibited by the constitutional text.  The authors insist that 
“Scalia-style originalists . . . should reject the use of any legislative history as a tool 
in . . . constitutional interpretation.”276  In practice, however, they do resort to 
legislative history so long as it provides a predicate for their preferred 
interpretation; they reject it only insofar as it demonstrates that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment rejected their conclusions. 
The predicate for their analysis is the widely-accepted proposition that the 
“Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”277  But 
how do we know that this proposition is true?  After all, the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is quite different from the language of the Civil Rights Act.  
We know that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to constitutionalize the 
Civil Rights Act, as Calabresi and Matthews point out, because the framers of the 
Amendment repeatedly said so.278  So much for the rejection of resort to legislative 
history. 
Now, Calabresi and Matthews would claim that they can establish this 
meaning without resorting to legislative history.  They examine the definitions of 
“privilege” and “immunity” in Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary and claim that both 
definitions refer to “positive law rights and not natural law rights.”279  However, the 
definitions quoted do not exactly say this (it is a gloss supplied by Calabresi and 
Matthews), and even if they did, it is not clear how that would advance their case.  
After all, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, which contemplates the 
denial of voting rights for women and some men, makes perfectly clear that it does 
not protect all positive law rights. 
So which positive law rights were protected?  According to Calabresi and 
Matthews, the “conclusion is inescapable” that an “objective reader” would look to 
the rights protected by Article IV, Section 2 to determine “the positive law 
privileges or immunities of state citizenship.”280  But if resort to legislative history 
is prohibited, it is hardly clear why such a conclusion is inescapable.  First, the text 
of the amendment refers to “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States,” not “privileges or immunities of state citizenship.”  Why would an 
objective reader, with no access to the legislative history, not read this as a 
reference to a different set of rights than the Article IV privileges and immunities 
of state citizenship, namely, to privileges or immunities of federal citizenship, as 
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Kurt Lash, for example, has argued?  On the other hand, even if Calabresi and 
Matthews are right that an objective reader would identify the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s privileges or immunities with Article IV’s privileges and 
immunities, the latter were protections only against interstate discrimination, not 
against discriminations by a state among its own citizens (this is Philip 
Hamburger’s basic point).  Calabresi and Matthews may well be right about the 
likely original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, but they simply cannot prove their point by consulting dictionaries and 
engaging in jejune textual analysis without resort to the legislative history. 
Having asserted that the Amendment constitutionalized the 1866 Act, the 
authors then observe that the Act guaranteed to all citizens “the same right . . . to 
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”281  Now, “the right 
to marry is just a subset of the right to make a particular form of contract”:282 ergo, 
it was protected by the 1866 Act and hence the Fourteenth Amendment.  Therefore, 
“[i]f a white citizen could contract to marry a white citizen, then according to the 
plain words of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 [and hence the Fourteenth 
Amendment] African Americans must have the identical right.”283 
The difficulty with this argument from an originalist perspective is that the 
framers and supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly confronted it and 
rejected it284 for two reasons.  First, they typically insisted that marriage was a civil 
right, not a social right, and hence not covered by the Civil Rights Act or the 
Fourteenth Amendment.285  Second, they argued that a ban on interracial marriage 
was not a form of discrimination, because it applied equally to blacks and whites 
by forbidding them to marry outside their race.286 
Nowadays we tend (rightly, in my view) to regard discrimination in marriage 
rights as a violation of fundamental civil rights.  Indeed, the argument that 
Calabresi and Matthews make is identical in structure to a major argument for the 
unconstitutionality of same-sex marriage—that it discriminates on the basis of sex 
because if a male citizen can marry a female citizen, a female citizen should have 
the same right.  However, the debates surrounding the framing and ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment suggest that its supporters understood its meaning more 
narrowly, as protecting the right to engage in commercial contracts but not 
                                                                                                     
 281. Id. at 1410 (quoting  Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27). 
 282. Id. at 1412. 
 283. Id. at 1424-25. 
 284. See generally Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The 
Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224 (1966). 
 285. For example, Rep. Samuel W. Moulton (R. Ill.) argued that the Freedman’s Bureau Bill’s 
protection of “civil rights” did not include the rights to marry or to sit on juries.  The right to marry, 
according to Moulton, was a “social right,” not a “civil right,” although he confusingly also insisted that 
“the right to marry is not strictly a right at all.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866). 
 286. This argument was made by supporters of the Civil Rights Act in response to objections by a 
leading Democratic opponent, Reverdy Johnson (D. Md.), who made exactly the same arguments about 
marriage that Calabresi and Matthews do.  Supporters of the Civil Rights Act such as Senator Lyman 
Trumbull insisted that miscegenation laws involved “no discrimination,” and Senator William P. 
Fessenden (R. Me.) likewise argued that miscegenation laws did not discriminate, because a black man 
had “the same right to make a contract of marriage with a white woman that a white man has with a 
black woman.”  Id. at 505. 
72 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
marriage, and as prohibiting asymmetrical but not symmetrical forms of 
discrimination. 
According to Calabresi and Matthews, “[i]ronically, the strongest arguments 
for the equality of all contract rights, including rights to enter into marriage 
contracts, is [sic] perhaps best articulated by the detractors of the Civil Rights 
Act.”287  There is in fact nothing ironic about this.  Democratic opponents of the 
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment knew that they stood little chance of passage if 
they were understood to outlaw bans on interracial marriage.  Proponents of these 
measures uniformly insisted that they would not have that effect.  Calabresi and 
Matthews insist that those proponents were wrong about that, adding that they “do 
not know or care whether the framers of the Civil Rights Act were fools, knaves, or 
crafty abolitionists.”288  But they seem to utterly discount the possibility that the 
framers honestly characterized their own understanding of the meaning of the Act 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.   
Calabresi’s originalist methodology undertakes a puzzling series of moves that 
are very difficult to explain except as dictated by a predetermined political agenda.  
He seeks to rescue for originalism those decisions that are now regarded as fixed 
landmarks in the law, and whose repudiation would be an embarrassment, while 
drawing the line at further developments.  He is able to do so only by resorting to 
arbitrary manipulation of interpretive levels of generality and a selective and 
tendentious use of evidence including, where necessary, post-enactment evidence, 
to achieve desired results. 
2. Balkin: Living Originalism 
In a provocative recent body of work, Jack Balkin has argued that “the debate 
between originalism and living constitutionalism rests on a false dichotomy.”289  
Like Calabresi and Barnett, Balkin insists that originalists are bound only by the 
original meaning of the constitutional text, not the original expected applications of 
those who adopted it.290  Balkin refers to his constitutional theory as “framework 
originalism” and his theory of interpretation and construction as the “method of 
text and principle.”291  Originalism mandates “[f]idelity to ‘original meaning,’” in 
Balkin’s view, only in the sense of the “semantic content of the words” in the 
constitutional text.292  But the text consists of provisions of varying levels of 
abstraction: specific “rules,” broader “standards,” and even more general 
“principles.”293  When the text states a specific rule, such as “the president must be 
thirty-five,” it can be applied directly.294  However, when the text states a general 
principle, such as “freedom of speech” or “equal protection,” those principles can 
be implemented only through the articulation of “underlying” or “subsidiary” 
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principles.295  Additional underlying principles, such as democracy, separation of 
powers, and checks and balances may be derived from the text, structure, and 
history of the Constitution as a whole, rather than from any particular provision.296 
For Balkin, while originalism mandates fidelity to the original semantic 
meaning of the rules, standards and principles in the constitutional text 
(constitutional “interpretation-as-ascertainment”), it leaves to future generations the 
articulation of underlying principles and doctrines needed to implement the text as 
law (constitutional “interpretation-as-construction”).297  While these underlying 
principles are not fixed and binding in the same sense as the text is, Balkin 
nonetheless argues that we should look at history in constructing them298 and that 
they should be articulated “at roughly the same level of generality as the text” that 
they “support and explain.”299   
Balkin contrasts his “framework originalism,” which understands the 
Constitution as a framework for government that must be filled in through a 
process of constitutional construction by the political branches, the judiciary, and 
mobilized popular movements, with “skyscraper originalism,” which “views the 
Constitution as more or less a finished project” that can be extended only through 
constitutional amendment.300  It is construction, not interpretation-as-ascertainment, 
that does most of the heavy lifting in Balkin’s “framework originalism,” and 
construction is not limited to the approaches of the framers.  Rather, subsequent 
political and social movements play a critical role in constitutional construction, 
invoking constitutional text and principles in new ways that transform their 
practical meaning.301  Over time, this process holds out hope of redeeming the 
Constitution’s promise of “a more perfect Union” as each generation adapts it to its 
own needs and makes it its own.302  It is in this sense that Balkin’s approach is both 
originalist and living constitutionalist. 
By insisting that constitutional construction should draw on history in 
articulating underlying principles, but only at roughly the same level of generality 
as the text, and that it should not be bound by original expected applications, 
Balkin erects a theory capacious enough to justify virtually any doctrine of modern 
constitutional law.  His theory privileges a highly abstract approach to the process 
of constitutional interpretation of the most doctrinally important constitutional 
clauses, which are themselves abstract texts.  In practice, he relies on history for the 
construction of constitutional doctrine, but is free to discard those portions of the 
historical understanding that are ill-suited to modern purposes.  As he describes it, 
“[t]he difference between [his] framework originalism and conservative originalism 
is the difference between viewing history as a resource and viewing it as a 
command.”303 
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Indeed, Balkin freely concedes that any resort to “original meaning” in legal 
interpretation necessarily selects only a portion of the rich array of cultural 
meanings of the text in its original historical setting and discards the rest.304  “There 
is no natural and value-free way to make this selection.”305  Moreover, although 
public-meaning originalism rejects reliance on the subjective intentions of the 
framers and ratifiers, “interpretation of a legal text always involves an ascription of 
purpose or intention to an author.”306  However, legal “practices of interpretation 
are . . . always anachronistic and selective because we are interpreting for a 
(present-day) purpose.”307 
Given that Balkin is “a liberal defending the modern state,”308 it is not 
surprising that for him this anachronistic and selective practice of interpretation 
yields expansive grants of power to the federal government as well as expansive 
protections for individual rights.  In this comprehensive theory, his treatment of the 
former (particularly the Commerce Clause) furnishes a crucial context for the latter 
(including the Fourteenth Amendment).  Balkin’s interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause takes as its starting point the idea that “commerce” is “intercourse,” an 
equation found not just in Gibbons v. Ogden,309 but also in Samuel Johnson’s 
eighteenth-century dictionary.310  “Intercourse” included not just economic 
transactions but “interactions, exchanges, interrelated activities, and movements 
back and forth, including, for example, travel, social connection, or 
conversation.”311  For Balkin, the “animating purpose” behind the list of 
enumerated powers found in Article I, Section 8 is stated in the resolution 
(Resolution VI) originally introduced by Edmund Randolph at the Philadelphia 
Convention and later slightly reworded by Gunning Bedford: to grant Congress the 
power “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in 
those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of 
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”312  
Thus, the Commerce Clause includes the power to regulate transactions with 
foreign nations or affecting more than one state that “require a federal solution” 
because leaving them to the individual states would produce “collective action 
problems” or harmful “spillover effects.”313 
Other originalists object that Balkin’s approach in effect substitutes the broad 
extra-textual power to legislate for the “general interests of the Union” for the 
narrower specific grants of power actually found in the constitutional text.314  It is 
true that “commerce” can bear the meaning of “interaction,” and as Balkin 
demonstrates, that meaning was substantially more common in the eighteenth 
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century than it is today.  Yet the primary meaning of the English word “commerce” 
(like its Latin source “commercium”) has always referred to trade or exchanges of 
merchandise (Latin “merx, mercis”).  For the semantic originalist, in choosing 
between the primary and secondary meanings, the question, according to Balkin, is 
how the term “was generally and publicly used when the text was adopted.”315  
Randy Barnett, surveying every use of the term in the Philadelphia convention, The 
Federalist, and the ratification conventions, concluded that it was always used in 
the sense of trade and not in any broader sense.316  In light of this evidence, Barnett 
argues, the Bedford Resolution cannot alter the original semantic meaning of 
“commerce” as “trade.”317  Balkin largely does not dispute Barnett’s evidence of 
usage.318  But if Barnett is correct about the original semantic meaning of 
“commerce,” it poses a devastating difficulty for Balkin’s entire liberal living 
originalist theory. 
As for the Fourteenth Amendment, Balkin, like other new originalists, relies 
heavily on the exposition of Senator Howard introducing the Amendment to the 
Senate.319  Balkin begins with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, “which the 
framers . . . designed to be its central guarantor of civil rights and civil liberties.”320 
This Clause, he argues, is a guarantee both of equality and substantive liberties, but 
it is “declaratory—its language does not specify the rights it protects but merely 
asserts their existence.”321  As Balkin explains:  
It uses a common law method to identify rights . . . [and] thus relies on tradition, 
but the tradition is often an invented tradition, or, at the very least, it is a tradition 
selectively viewed and interpreted from the standpoint of the present. . . . It treats 
tradition not as providing fixed rules but rather as offering legal and rhetorical 
resources for making arguments about justice in the present.322 
The Clause thereby protects against state infringement of not only all textually 
enumerated individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution (such as those in the 
Bill of Rights), but also fundamental unenumerated rights.323  But given that there 
is no general agreement on the scope of unenumerated rights, how are they to be 
ascertained?  Balkin suggests that “[o]ne way to do this—although not the only 
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way—is to look at the kinds of rights that have historically or traditionally been 
protected by states, or rights that almost all of the states have recognized or 
protected.”324  Thus, “[u]nenumerated rights will come and go over very long 
periods of time” and even the scope of enumerated rights “will depend on 
constitutional constructions that may also change over time.”325  In this “dynamic 
conception . . . [r]ights become fundamental and timeless . . .  when the time is 
right for them.”326 
A critical role in the “ebb and flow of unenumerated rights” in this model is 
played by “sustained political or social mobilization” for or against them.327  Even 
the scope of enumerated rights will ebb and flow in response to social and political 
mobilizations.328  Balkin cites the Court’s repudiation of Lochnerian freedom of 
contract in 1937 as an example of the way constitutional rights can contract as well 
as expand.329  As a descriptive model, it is not clear that Balkin’s living originalism 
explains constitutional practice better than common-law constitutionalism.  The 
Lochner Court recognized freedom of contract as a fundamental right not because 
of social and political mobilizations in favor of that result, but despite major 
mobilizations against it.  The Supreme Court in the Progressive Era was not a 
Progressive Court.  And once the Court recognized freedom of contract as a 
fundamental right, it tended to be self-perpetuating, at least until the economic 
catastrophe of the 1930s led to a constitutional crisis. 
The Equal Protection Clause, in Balkin’s view, is directed not just at 
discriminatory executive enforcement or remedies, but also at discriminatory 
legislation.330  This broad scope (which accords with modern doctrine), is, in 
Balkin’s view, inherent in the original semantic meaning—laws, and not just 
officials, “protect.”  Of course, other originalists have made the opposite 
argument,331 but according to Balkin, “[t]he words ‘equal protection’ mean the 
same today as they did in 1868”332—“the original meaning of ‘equal protection’ is 
‘equal protection.’”333  “Interpretation-as-ascertainment” yields an empty tautology.  
A nonoriginalist might look to current doctrine for the meaning, but if we are not 
constrained by doctrine, the possibilities are endless.  As David Strauss has argued, 
a socialist or social democrat might argue that “equal protection” requires massive 
redistribution of wealth;334 a free-market fundamentalist might argue that it 
prohibits redistribution; under current doctrine it neither requires nor prohibits 
redistribution.  Under Balkin’s approach, originalist interpretation-as-ascertainment 
does nothing to narrow these possibilities. The real work is done by construction, 
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and we are free to reject original constructions and adopt new ones.335 
Finally, according to Balkin, the Due Process Clause guaranteed not just “fair 
procedures” but also “‘vested’ rights” and “equality before the law.”336  It therefore 
overlaps to a certain extent with the other two clauses. 
With this theoretical armory at his disposal, Balkin is able to defend virtually 
all the results of modern Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, including the holding in 
Roe v. Wade,337 the bête noire of conservative originalists.  Laws banning abortion, 
he argues, violate equal protection because they “impose special burdens on 
women not suffered by men,” and force women to become mothers against their 
will, keeping them in a “socially dependent status.”338  These laws thus constitute 
caste and class legislation.  Secondly, Balkin argues, while the right to abortion 
may not have been a privilege or immunity of citizens in 1973, when Roe was 
decided, there is a “far stronger case” for such a conclusion today.339  While in 
1973, when Roe was decided, only a minority of states recognized a right to 
abortion, “today, it is likely” that even if Roe were overruled, “an overwhelming 
majority of the states would protect some kind of right to abortion.”340 
Balkin’s originalism avoids a close adherence to the specific political and 
ideological commitments of the framers.  The fact that many proponents of the 
Fourteenth Amendment argued that it simply constitutionalized the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, Balkin argues, does not demonstrate that the Amendment should be 
construed simply to track the Act.341  The Amendment is worded at a higher level 
of generality than the Act.  Likewise, the framers’ statements that the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not require integrated public schools, or legalize racial 
intermarriage, may be dismissed as original expected applications not binding on 
semantic originalists.  But underlying those expectations was in fact a theory or 
general principle, the distinction between civil, social and political rights, or what 
Balkin calls the “tripartite theory of citizenship.”342  This theory is a general 
principle that accounts for many of the framers’ original expected applications.  
Nevertheless, Balkin maintains, it is a constitutional construction rather than a 
textual principle.  Moreover, he argues, the distinctions it embodies are at odds 
with our modern understanding of economic and racial equality in the wake of the 
New Deal and the civil rights revolution.343  Thus Balkin rejects this original 
construction as unacceptable to modern Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
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Balkin’s originalism, which allows for enormous discretion in constitutional 
interpretation, is unlikely to prove attractive to most other originalists.  While 
Balkin seeks to deploy originalist arguments in favor of the right to abortion, he 
concedes that “[o]f course people can also use the same interpretive method to 
argue against the right to abortion.”344  The same could be said about most other 
salient constitutional issues—when the textual meaning and associated “underlying 
principles” are articulated at a high enough level of generality, almost any result 
that is within the broad scope of current constitutional discourse can be defended.  
The rise of originalism and its wide appeal in certain circles is closely connected 
with the claim that it alone is able to furnish the constitution with a “fixed 
meaning,” and avoid the “invitation to apply current societal values.”345  Thus, it is 
not surprising that other originalists have sharply criticized Balkin’s approach,346  
which seems largely to collapse the distinction between originalism and 
nonoriginalism.347 
At the same time, while many nonoriginalists may find Balkin’s embrace of 
the transformational role of social movements attractive, they are unlikely to be 
fully convinced that originalism is compatible with the living Constitution.  Balkin 
argues that the most important and productive provisions of the Constitution, such 
as the Commerce Clause and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are framed at a 
high level of generality and that any supporting or underlying principles should be 
framed at a similarly high level of generality.  But what if the best historical 
evidence shows that this is not the case?  What if “commerce” was understood not 
as embracing all social interactions but only trade and navigation?  What if terms 
such as “freedom of speech,” “privileges or immunities,” or “equal protection” 
were understood not as broad general principles but as legal terms of art?  As we 
have seen above, in the case of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Hamburger 
and Lash have made different arguments along these lines, yielding different and 
much narrower accounts of the Clause’s meaning than the one proposed by Balkin.  
Is the binding semantic meaning ascribed to the Clause to vary according to the 
latest historical account to find favor with a given judge or other interpreter? 
Arguably, Balkin’s account of the original semantic meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is broader than the text warrants.  He claims that the framers’ tripartite 
distinction between civil, social, and political rights is not part of the original 
meaning, but merely a construction that may be freely rejected by modern 
originalists.  Yet as Balkin concedes,348 the distinction between civil and political 
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rights is presupposed by the text of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates that states might freely 
abridge the political rights of women, and that they might abridge the political 
rights of black males merely upon penalty of reduced representation.  The Fifteenth 
Amendment further confirms that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit 
racial discrimination in voting rights, for otherwise it would have been 
unnecessary.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s textual authorization of discrimination 
in political rights suggests that the tripartite distinction, or at least the distinction 
between civil and political rights, is not just a construction, but a core part of the 
Amendment’s original semantic meaning.  Under Balkin’s theory, semantic 
meaning is unalterable.   
Balkin does suggest a solution to this problem, but it will not convince 
everyone.  The successive extensions of the franchise in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, 
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, he argues, give rise to a “general 
structural principle” that “there should be no distinction between political and civil 
equality for adult citizens without a compelling justification.”349  The reasoning 
Balkin employs here is not unlike Justice Douglas’ claim in Griswold v. 
Connecticut that a broad constitutional right of privacy arises from “penumbras, 
formed by emanations” from specific textual guarantees found in the First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.350  Perhaps Justice Douglas’ formulation 
does not really deserve all the scorn that has been heaped upon it, but the common 
criticism is that the specific guarantees in the text indicate that it does not contain a 
broad guarantee of the right to privacy at the level that Justice Douglas articulated 
in Griswold.  After all, one could equally well construct a Lochnerite fundamental 
right to contract and property prohibiting any attempts to redistribute wealth or 
equalize bargaining power out of “penumbras and emanations” from the Contracts, 
Coinage, and Credit Clauses of Article I, section 10, and the Due Process and 
Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.351  Likewise, one may object that the 
four amendments extending the franchise did so in specific and limited ways and 
did not establish a broad guarantee of voting rights at the level of generality 
suggested by Balkin.  It is hard to see how his theory is really more satisfying than 
the view that the courts, in response to social movements in the past century and a 
half, have gradually given meaning to the indeterminate text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which is now read (contrary to the original understanding) to prohibit 
irrational discrimination in all sorts of rights, including political rights.  The voting 
rights decisions of the Warren Court, which invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to 
strike down state poll taxes352 and the malapportionment of state legislatures,353 are 
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among the most legitimate exercises of judicial power in American history.  But 
they are very difficult to justify under any originalist theory. 
Moreover, Balkin’s preferred construction of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause is utterly unmoored from the original theory underlying the text.  As he 
observes, the framers tended to cling to a conception of natural rights that “preexist 
governments” and that the people “‘have always’ had.”354  To the extent that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was viewed as protecting such rights, they were 
seen as fixed, unchanging, and eternal.  Of course, the idea that natural rights could 
form the basis of a workable legal system was criticized by perspicacious observers 
even in the Eighteenth Century355 and seems quaint to most people today.   
Balkin, on the other hand, looks to positive law to identify protected privileges 
or immunities, which in his conception are emphatically not a set of “fixed 
rules.”356 Rather, he suggests that unenumerated fundamental rights may be 
identified by looking at what rights the states have “historically or traditionally” 
protected, or what rights “almost all of the states have recognized or protected.”357  
This is a decidedly positivist conception of rights at odds with the jusnaturalist 
assumptions of the framers.  Such rights will “ebb and flow,” they will “come and 
go” over time: Balkin cites freedom of contract as an example.358  But in an era 
where a majority of jurisdictions treated freedom of contract as a fundamental 
right, Balkin’s nose-counting approach would tend to continue to impose it even in 
the face of broad social mobilizations against it.  That is essentially what happened 
for more than three decades under Lochnerism.  So although Balkin argues that his 
approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause is dynamic, it has great potential to 
be deployed to protect the status quo.359  It provides no general principle to 
distinguish fundamental from nonfundamental rights based on their nature, but 
simply protects those rights that have been and are already protected. 
3. Barnett: The Libertarian Constitution 
Randy Barnett has embraced nearly all the moves that distinguish the new 
originalism from its earlier forerunners.360  He disavows reliance on the subjective 
intentions of the framers in favor of inquiry into “the public or objective meaning 
that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional 
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provision at the time of its enactment.”361  This hypothetical meaning is generally 
to be determined by reference to such sources as “dictionaries, common 
contemporary meanings, an analysis of how particular words and phrases are used 
elsewhere in the document or in other foundational documents and cases, and 
logical inferences from the structure and general purposes of the text.”362  A “richly 
detailed legislative history” is not generally required, and “original meaning 
originalists need not concern themselves” with the specific intended applications of 
the language used, except as “circumstantial evidence” of the meaning of technical 
words and phrases.363 
In practice, however, Barnett’s analysis of key constitutional provisions, 
including the Necessary and Proper Clause,364 the Commerce Clause,365 the Ninth 
Amendment,366 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause,367 relies heavily on the 
same sort of resort to legislative history and statements of subjective 
understandings as the old originalism.  Based largely on evidence drawn from 
legislative history (though not a terribly “richly detailed” one),368 Barnett concludes 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects a broad set of rights that include 
both natural rights (enumerated and unenumerated) and positive-law rights.369  The 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by importing the 
language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Comity Clause) of Article IV, 
incorporated the antebellum understanding exemplified in such decisions as 
Corfield v. Coryell,370 which identified these rights as consisting both of the natural 
rights retained by the people, as well as “such positive civil rights as the ‘protection 
of government’ that one receives in exchange for surrendering one’s power of 
enforcement” of natural rights to the state.371  Barnett highlights the repeated 
reliance on Article IV and Corfield by the leading proponents of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, such as Senator Trumbull and Representatives Wilson and 
Lawrence.372  Finally, he points to Senator Howard’s speech, which quoted at 
                                                                                                     
 361. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 92. 
 362. Id. at 93 (citations omitted). 
 363. Id. 
 364. See id. at 155-90. 
 365. See id. at 278-94. 
 366. See id. at 235-42. 
 367. See id. at 60-68. 
 368. Cf. Jack N. Rakove, Book Review, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 660, 667 (2005) (“Barnett’s 
examination of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment is too cursory to satisfy anyone who wants to 
reason from robust evidence rather than imaginative inference.”).  Barnett’s discussion contains some 
careless errors.  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 39, at 61 (referring to Representative John A. Bingham 
of Ohio, the principal draftsman of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as “Senator” Bingham); id. 
at 193 (referring to Bingham as “John Bingham of New York” (Bingham never lived in New York)); id. 
at 63-64 (repeatedly referring to Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, the principal draftsman of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, as Lyman “Trumbell”). 
 369. See BARNETT, supra note 39, at 61 (arguing that “while ‘privileges or immunities’ includes 
natural rights, it is a broader term that includes additional rights.”). 
 370. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa.1823) (No. 3,230). 
 371. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 63. 
 372. See id. at 63-64.  While these legislators stressed that the Civil Rights Act protected natural 
rights, Barnett cites Lawrence as confirming that the privileges and immunities protected by Article IV 
included positive rights as well.  See id. at 65.  Lawrence did state, as Barnett observes, that privileges 
and immunities include both rights “inherent in every citizen of the United States, and such others as 
82 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
length from Corfield’s explication of privileges and immunities (a set of rights that 
“cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature”), and added to 
those “the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of 
the Constitution.”373 
Given the vagueness of the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,374 
Barnett’s resort to legislative history to elucidate its meaning is understandable.  
Yet a more careful and richly detailed account of these same materials (which 
Barnett eschews as unnecessary) would cast doubt on his claim that the very broad 
meaning he attributes to the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the meaning that a 
reasonable contemporary observer would attribute to it.  Although various 
legislators referred to natural rights, and Howard and (more obliquely) Bingham 
adverted to incorporation or something similar, the most common meaning 
attributed to the Clause was that it simply prohibited discrimination in the same 
limited set of positive state law rights (such as property, contract, and access to the 
courts) protected by the Civil Rights Act. 375  The more closely one looks at the 
debates over framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the more 
difficult it is to assert that there existed a single widely-held historical 
understanding of its meaning or to declare with confidence exactly what “objective 
meaning” a “reasonable listener” would attach to its language. 
Under Barnett’s theory, the Ninth Amendment requires “the strict construction 
of any power that restricts the exercise of individual liberty, whether that liberty is 
enumerated or unenumerated,”376 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment refers to “the same set of unenumerable rights.”377  Yet 
Barnett cites no statements during the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment linking its Privileges or Immunities Clause to the Ninth Amendment.  
The only specific support he cites for equating the two is a post-ratification remark 
by Senator John Sherman that “the privileges, immunities, and rights . . . of citizens 
of the United States,” as the Ninth Amendment recognizes, are “innumerable,” and 
must be sought not only in the Constitution, but also in “every scrap of American 
history,” in “the history of England,” and in “the common law.”378 
Yet as Kurt Lash has argued, although one can point to some “sporadic 
attempts to read the Ninth” Amendment during Reconstruction as a guarantee of 
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personal rights capable of being incorporated against the states, there “are far more 
numerous statements on (and applications of) the Ninth as a federalist rule of 
construction.”379  If the Ninth Amendment were understood as a broad guarantee of 
individual rights, it is certainly odd that the antislavery constitutionalists, otherwise 
so creative in their interpretation of the text, never relied on it, and that the leading 
proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment cited as favoring incorporation, such as 
Howard and Bingham, never referred to it.380  However, Lash notes, the Ninth 
Amendment was frequently invoked by slaveholders and secessionists.381  
Although central to Barnett’s constitutional theory, the Ninth Amendment appears 
to have been of marginal importance for the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
If the terms privileges or immunities (separately or in combination) were 
understood to refer to natural rights (or to positive rights acquired in exchange for 
the loss of certain natural rights), that tells us little specifically about what those 
rights were.  While natural rights theorists often speak as if the concept of natural 
rights is a perfectly clear one on which a stable and determinate legal doctrine can 
be based, that has never been the case.  As Justice Iredell wisely said: “The ideas of 
natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men 
have differed upon the subject . . . .”382 
Barnett argues that while the Slaughter-House Cases383 departed from the 
original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the doctrine of 
substantive due process that emerged in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries largely repaired the damage, 
“restor[ing] rather than violat[ing] the original historical meaning of Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment taken as a whole.”384  Barnett enthusiastically endorses 
the Court’s jurisprudence during this era, including the decision that most modern 
scholars have treated as emblematic of judicial overreaching: Lochner v. New 
York.385  According to Barnett, “[t]he majority’s position [in Lochner] can most 
accurately be characterized as adopting the conception of civil rights or ‘privileges 
or immunities’ held by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”386  The 
Lochner Court deployed what Barnett calls a “Presumption of Liberty”387 that 
included vigorous judicial protection of contract and property rights.  In the wake 
of the New Deal, the Court abandoned this approach in favor of a general 
presumption of constitutionality and currently grants heightened protection only to 
specifically enumerated rights and to a “judicially favored”388 subset of 
unenumerated rights deemed fundamental. 
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The choice between the Lochner era’s “Presumption of Liberty” and the 
modern presumption of constitutionality, Barnett writes, “is largely a matter of 
constitutional construction” rather than interpretation, because the constitutional 
text “does not explicitly establish any presumption.”389  Yet elsewhere he suggests 
the opposite: the modern Court’s presumption of constitutionality is 
“incompatibl[e] . . . with the text of the Constitution”390 and “violate[s]” the Ninth 
Amendment.391 
Of course, the presumption of liberty cannot be absolute, for otherwise 
government could scarcely exist.  Barnett recognizes that government must have 
the power “to prohibit wrongful or regulate rightful activity.”392  So where is the 
line between rightful and wrongful activity, and between proper and improper 
regulation?  Barnett argues that the line is largely (though perhaps not entirely) that 
drawn by judge-made common law: “The freedom to act within the boundaries 
provided by one’s common law or ‘civil’ rights may be viewed as a central 
background presumption of the Constitution.”393  He is willing to admit that 
legislation “can occasionally be used”394 to alter the common law, but insists that 
such legislation should be “comparatively rare.”395  The more the legislature acts to 
alter common-law rights, the greater judicial skepticism is warranted.396 
Barnett’s constitutional presumption of liberty, which he concedes is a matter 
of construction rather than interpretation, seems to derive, as Trevor Morrison has 
argued, “not from the Constitution itself, but from the libertarian ideology 
Professor Barnett reads into the Constitution.”397  Furthermore, while the framers 
cherished the common law and undoubtedly incorporated many common-law 
institutions (such as trial by jury and the writ of habeas corpus) into the 
Constitution, Barnett provides little support for his sweeping claim that the 
common law establishes general background presumptions against which the 
constitutional propriety of legislation may be measured.  Madison emphatically 
rejected the notion that the common law was “adopted or recognized by the 
constitution.”398  For example, the common law of seditious libel treated criticism 
of the government as wrongful, but it is far from clear that the First Amendment 
incorporates that view.  As Madison said, “[i]f it be understood that the common 
law is established by the constitution” then “all its incongruities, barbarisms, and 
bloody maxims would be inviolably saddled on the good people of the United 
States.”399  Barnett seems to envisage that the line between rightful and wrongful 
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conduct should be determined by reference to state common law400 rather than 
some general or federal common law, which only raises additional problems.  As 
Madison recognized, state common law cannot provide a uniform standard by 
which to measure the constitutionality of legislation under the federal Constitution, 
because even prior to the Revolution, “[t]he common law was not the same in any 
two of the colonies.”401  Since that time, the number of state jurisdictions, and the 
divergences among them, have only multiplied.  State common law cannot provide 
a unified standard for adjudication of federal constitutional rights and powers, 
much less a fixed one.402 
Barnett’s approach, which is deeply suspicious of legislation, extends and 
elevates to constitutional status the maxim that statutes in derogation of the 
common law are to be strictly construed.  But it is unclear why judge-made private 
law should set the constitutional contours of public legislative power.  Certainly 
neither constitutional text nor original meaning establishes any such presumption.  
The founders did not make a fetish of the common law,403 much less elevate it to 
constitutional status.404 
Despite these problems there is much of value in Barnett’s constitutional 
vision.  He is certainly right to seek to ground his theory of constitutional 
interpretation not in assertions of the authority of the framers to bind their posterity, 
but rather in an inquiry into the constitutional foundations of a just and workable 
political order.  He makes a persuasive case for a wider scope for constitutional 
liberty in many areas, for example, as a check on our cruel, wasteful, and 
counterproductive drug laws.405  But his argument for a revival of the Lochnerian 
protections of property and contract rights is not textually or historically 
persuasive.  Such an approach, by entrenching the power of economically powerful 
elites, is more likely to restrict than enhance the liberty of most ordinary people. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
By casting Section One in the language of privileges or immunities and due 
process, the framers could claim that it effected no radical change but simply made 
already existing constitutional guarantees enforceable.  Differences between 
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radicals, moderates, and conservatives were submerged in a text that all could agree 
upon, because each member of Congress and of the ratifying public was free to 
read it in his own way.  The Fourteenth Amendment was a mirror in which each 
found reflected his own political views and vision of a just constitutional order.  
This phenomenon is typical in constitution-making.  We are able to agree on 
abstract terms such as “freedom of speech,” prohibition of “cruel and unusual 
punishments,” protection of the “privileges and immunities of citizens,” “due 
process,” and “equal protection” precisely because we attach our own meanings to 
these terms. 
The basic difficulty in seeking to elucidate the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is that, as William Nelson put it, “[s]ection one simply fails 
to specify at all the particular rights to which it applies.”406  The framers and 
ratifiers were agreed on a basic principle of equality but could not agree on its 
specific content.  Indeed, the “ultimate emptiness” of the principle was a condition 
“essential to creating the supermajorities” required to assure passage and 
ratification.407  In particular, the Amendment does not specify the rights protected, 
the nature of the protection (whether absolute or only against discriminatory 
treatment), or the criterion for determining protected classes.  Judicial decisions 
over the course of the last one hundred forty years have succeeded in resolving 
these questions in substantial detail.  An attempt to return to the original 
understanding would completely unsettle the law and create utter chaos in the 
constitutional protection of human rights. 
If the framing generation had no common understanding of Section One, it is 
hardly surprising that a century and a half later there is no consensus among 
scholars as to its original meaning.  Indeed, the quest for a single “original 
meaning” is a misguided one.  The diversity of original understandings presents 
intractable difficulties that cannot be overcome by the fiction of a single original 
“objective” meaning that a hypothetical “reasonable observer” would attribute to 
the text.  We are forced to inquire: What are the political and ideological 
commitments of that reasonable observer?  In what contexts does the observer 
situate the text?  What is the observer’s understanding of existing constitutional and 
legal norms?  There is no neutral or objective way of answering these questions.  
Any attempt to reduce the multiplicity of possible original understandings to a 
single original meaning is a distortion and ultimately a falsification of history. 
In addition to abandoning the search for actual historical meaning in favor of a 
hypothetical “objective” meaning, recent originalist scholars also deploy the 
distinction between interpretation and construction.  This distinction enables them 
to dismiss as mere “constructions” or “subjective expected applications” statements 
by the framers that privileges and immunities did not include political rights (such 
as the right to vote or serve on juries) or social rights (such as the right to 
intermarry or attend common schools), or that gender discrimination involves no 
inequality.  But if these statements can be dismissed as mere subjective expected 
applications, why not also statements by the framers that the Amendment protected 
core civil rights to hold property, or to move about freely, or to testify in court, or 
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that it prohibited racial discrimination with respect to those rights?  Given the 
vagueness of the text, the distinction between interpretation and construction is 
arbitrary and almost infinitely manipulable.  It can be used to contract or expand 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment at will.  
On the one hand, a modern interpreter cannot help viewing the text in light of 
the meanings it has acquired over decades of constitutional interpretation by the 
people, their elected representatives, and the courts.  We tend to view central tenets 
of modern doctrine as essential components of the original meaning, so that, for 
example, originalists tend to insist that the Amendment prohibits racial segregation 
in public education, as the Court held in Brown v. Board of Education, even if the 
framers almost universally rejected that view.408  Originalist inquiry is inevitably 
subject to what a contemporary of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment 
sardonically called “the law of retrospection, which presents all the past as a 
preparation for the accomplished fact.”409 
On the other hand, the originalist scholar will often tend to emphasize the 
historical evidence that best accords with her own ethical and political values and 
commitments.  This phenomenon of “confirmation bias” is one that philosophers 
have long been familiar with and is amply confirmed in the psychological 
literature.410  It is not necessarily the case that originalists consciously select and 
emphasize only that evidence that supports their own commitments, but as human 
beings they often do so unintentionally and even unwittingly. 
In reading the debates and discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, one cannot help being struck by participants’ seriousness, 
learning, foresight, and oratorical skill, and by their determination to forge a more 
free and just world.  Our own age, with its debased and trivial political and 
journalistic culture, has much to learn from theirs, if only we would listen.  The 
leaders of the Radical Republicans, such as Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner, 
and the great nineteenth-century advocates for human rights like Frederick 
Douglass, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Susan B. Anthony, though lesser known, 
deserve the title of founders of our nation as much as Washington, Jefferson, 
Adams, and Madison.  Yet we also find in these debates, even among the 
Republicans, examples of petty bigotry, political cravenness, and opportunism.  
Our Constitution will be enriched if we draw upon the best of their legacy but do 
not seek to stifle and simplify it by a reductionist quest for a single original 
meaning. 
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The various meanings ascribed to the Fourteenth Amendment by its framers 
and ratifiers are a starting point of an ongoing process by which its meaning has 
evolved to this day and will continue to evolve in the future.  Their struggles for 
freedom and equality should remain a constant source of inspiration to their 
posterity.  But to insist that their multifarious understandings can be reduced to a 
single original meaning is to traduce our own history and constitutional traditions.  
Moreover, we should not ignore the ways in which the Amendment’s meaning has 
been enriched by the struggles of succeeding generations.  Through the gradual 
evolution of its meaning, our living Constitution has come to embody the 
accumulated wisdom of past and present generations, over time rendering its 
protections of liberty and equality broader, more concrete, and more secure. 
